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INSURANCE AGAINST CATASTROPHE: 
GOVERNMENT STIMULATION OF 
INSURANCE MARKETS FOR CATASTROPHIC 
EVENTS 
VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, MICHAEL FAURE & TOBIAS HELDT† 
INTRODUCTION 
As a result of climate change, technological development, and 
other variables, natural and technological catastrophes have increased 
dramatically.1 Moreover, due to infrastructural issues, such as building 
in floodplains, damages resulting from catastrophes have increased as 
well.2 The massive earthquake and tsunami that occurred in Japan on 
March 11, 2011 are still fresh in people’s memories, providing 
sobering illustrations of the extensive reach of such catastrophes.  
After a catastrophe, which is defined for the purposes of this 
Article as an accident with large losses in either the number of victims 
or the amount of property damage, governments often intervene in 
the compensation of catastrophe victims. However, the organization 
of government intervention in the compensation varies from one 
country to another and from one disaster to another. Governments 
intervene either because no satisfying solution is available in the 
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 1.  See Laurens M. Bouwer, Have Disaster Losses Increased Due to Anthropogenic 
Climate Change?, 92 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 39, 43 (2011) (discussing increased 
economic losses resulting from climate change-influenced disasters). 
 2.  See id. 
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private market or to fulfill the requirements of existing compensation 
schemes. Political pressure for such intervention may also be large. 
Private insurance markets for catastrophic risks may fail for a 
variety of reasons, and governments may try to intervene to stimulate 
the insurability of catastrophic risks or to take over insurance 
functions when markets fail. Demand for catastrophe insurance may 
be too low even though such insurance would result in increased 
utility for potential victims (as in the case of flood insurance). In 
other cases, risk-modeling calculations may be difficult or the damage 
that could potentially be caused by a catastrophe may overwhelm the 
capacity of insurance markets. 
Government intervention in compensation for catastrophe 
victims can take a variety of forms. In some cases (for example, in 
France), the government forces potential victims to purchase 
comprehensive insurance; in others (for example, in the case of the 
California Earthquake Authority), the government replaces the 
primary insurer and directly provides coverage to potential disaster 
victims. In yet other situations (for example, with terrorism risk), the 
government acts as a reinsurer of last resort and intervenes when the 
magnitude of loss exceeds a specific threshold. The government may 
also provide an additional insurance layer—for example, in nuclear 
liability conventions, the government supplements compensation 
provided by the operator of the power plant. Finally, the government 
may provide direct compensation to victims of catastrophes either 
through structural fund solutions or on an ad hoc basis.  
These various forms of government intervention have been 
criticized in the literature. Most of the criticism concentrates on 
government provision of ex post compensation on an ad hoc basis.3 
However, some critics also address the type of government 
intervention on which we focus in this Article—on the government 
acting as a facilitator of insurance markets or as a reinsurer of last 
resort.4 Notwithstanding the criticism, schemes in which the 
government facilitates the insurability of catastrophic risks—including 
terrorism and natural disasters—are on the rise. The importance of 
compensating victims of catastrophes (after 9/11, the focus was 
 
 3.  See generally Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996); see also Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for 
Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and Economics Perspective, 29 L. & POL’Y 339 (2007). 
 4.  See Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, A Role for Government?, 25 REG. 44, 44 (2002) 
[hereinafter Role for Government]; see also Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and 
Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 448 (2003). 
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strongly on terrorism; after Katrina, flooding came to the forefront; 
and after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, compensation for 
victims of those risks soared on the political agenda) gives rise to the 
question whether such a government role should indeed be 
considered problematic, especially when compared with the 
alternative of providing outright ex post compensation to victims on 
an ad hoc basis. This is the main question we will address in this 
Article. 
Our paper is structured as follows: we first identify the various 
types of government intervention in compensating victims of 
catastrophes. Next, we focus specifically on the types of government 
intervention that stimulate insurability of catastrophic risks and 
analyze how these forms of intervention can be considered from a 
law-and-economics perspective. Then, we focus more particularly on 
the role of government as a (re)insurer of catastrophic risks and 
sketch the conditions under which such intervention may be effective. 
Finally, we compare these starting points with several cases (relating 
to both terrorism and natural disasters) in which the government 
stimulates insurability.  
I. TYPES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN COMPENSATION FOR 
CATASTROPHES 
Natural catastrophes, industrial disasters, and terrorist attacks 
pose a number of challenges for insurers. These catastrophes involve 
very large losses that occur only rarely, and this requires large 
financial reserves to be built up over time. Pricing catastrophe 
insurance products is complicated by a number of factors, including 
the difficulty of predicting the frequency and probability of 
catastrophic accidents and their related losses (although some 
catastrophe-modeling firms have made such calculations the core of 
their business).5 Spreading the risk of catastrophe losses over a 
sufficiently large base of buyers is also difficult and makes it harder 
for insurers to offer affordable products.6 Given these obstacles, the 
traditional insurance sector will increasingly have to rely upon the 
reinsurance (i.e. insurance for insurance companies) market to 
 
 5.  See ZURICH AM. INSURANCE CO., CATASTROPHE RISK AND THE COST OF REAL 
ESTATE INSURANCE POLICIES (2009), available at http://www.zurichna.com/internet/zna/ 
sitecollectiondocuments/en/media/whitepapers/rewhitepapercatastropherisk.pdf. 
 6.  See Michael Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party 
Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) (discussing the lack of demand for first-party disaster 
coverage). 
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recompense catastrophic damages to the victims. However, Professor 
Kenneth Froot found that insurers generally use reinsurance to cover 
only a small fraction of the financial exposure of households and 
firms to catastrophic natural disasters.7 This is all the more worrying 
because many primary insurance companies do not have enough 
capital and surplus themselves to survive medium and large 
catastrophes.8 
Admittedly, the Solvency II Directive9 mitigates this situation to 
a certain extent because insurers and reinsurers are obliged to have 
sufficient capital in their reserves for all of the risks that they are 
facing. This reduces the risk of insolvency; however, it does not 
eliminate the possibility of insufficient capital in case of a large-scale 
catastrophe. In sum, both insurance and reinsurance markets may fail, 
given that the losses resulting from mega-disasters may be too large 
for the reinsurers’ financial capacities.10 
Given these difficulties, what role can be granted to the 
government in the context of financing compensation for victims of 
catastrophes? More particularly, how can the state improve the 
functioning of catastrophe (re)insurance markets? The government 
can take several seemingly different approaches in crafting policies 
for managing catastrophe risks and compensating attendant losses.11 
“First, the government can rely primarily on the private insurance 
market.”12 Second, the government can provide direct compensation 
to the catastrophe victims.13 Third, the government can institute 
mandatory comprehensive insurance. Fourth, the government itself 
 
 7.  KENNETH A. FROOT, THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 1, 2 (Kenneth A. Froot 
ed., 1999). 
 8.  See id.: see also VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: 
A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 136 (Kurt Deketelaere et al. eds., 2010). 
 9.  See Directive 2009/138, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 on the Taking-Up and Pursuit of the Business of Insurance and Reinsurance 
(Solvency II), 2009 O.J. (L 1104) 1, 24. 
 10.  The high catastrophe losses sustained in the first half of 2011 have already had an 
impact on capital and pricing in the reinsurance market. Since the January 1, 2011 insurance 
contracts renewal, the decline in the capital positions of some reinsurers has exerted pricing 
pressure on catastrophe-exposed markets. See Guy Carpenter, WORLD CATASTROPHE 
REINSURANCE MARKET REVIEW 6 (September 2011), available at http://www.guycarp.com/ 
portal/extranet/insights/reportsPDF/2011/World%20Catastrophe%20Report%202011.pdf;jsessi
onid=Pp8bH0fPwZX3cnp53yR4Fzr2tBZFrs6GW2TLJ7FLhJB0ZGdn9HpQ!-
1763263147?vid=2. 
 11.  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 187. 
 12.  Id. at 188. 
 13.  Id. 
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can provide catastrophe insurance. “[Fifth,] the government can share 
the catastrophe risk with the private sector by acting as a reinsurer of 
last resort.”14 Sixth, the government can finance catastrophic damages 
through an additional insurance layer above the insurers’ own 
financing. Finally, new forms of government intervention, such as 
acting as a lender of last resort, have been proposed. Government 
intervention can also include a combination of any of these 
mechanisms.15 
The remainder of this section will discuss the various ways in 
which the government can intervene in compensating victims of 
catastrophes, along with providing relevant examples. In some cases, 
government intervention can be insurance-related or can stimulate 
insurability, whereas in others, government does not take any 
insurance objectives into account. The main thrust of our article is 
that government collaboration with insurance markets is generally 
preferred over mechanisms in which such collaboration is absent.  
A. Relying on the Private Insurance Market16 
This approach entails the least amount of government 
intervention in catastrophe insurance markets. The government does 
not assume any risk for losses covered by catastrophe insurance. 
Instead, it focuses on removing barriers that limit the ability of 
insurance markets to provide catastrophe coverage. 
Various options for increasing capacity of private insurance 
markets are open to the government. First, federal regulations can be 
relaxed to encourage the issuance of catastrophe bonds (for example, 
by making it easier to issue bonds for which the principal and not just 
the interest of the bondholder is at risk). Second, and especially 
relevant for the United States, accounting standards and tax laws can 
be adapted so that private insurers can establish reserves in 
anticipation of catastrophic events on a tax-free basis. The idea is that 
if insurance firms hold sufficient capital and reserves, then the risk of 
ruin from a catastrophic event can be reduced to a manageable level, 
thus allowing for the emergence of a private market for catastrophe 
insurance.17 Third, government can help set up a voluntary pool of 
numerous insurers active in the catastrophe insurance market. Mutual 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Part I.A borrows from a book written by one of the authors: BRUGGEMAN, supra note 
8, at 188. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted. 
 17.  This is one of the purposes of the European Solvency II Directive. 
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risk retention pools, organized within the private markets, help create 
private markets for the provision of catastrophe insurance. Of course, 
these options might allow insurers to cover larger losses than they 
would be able to cover otherwise, but it is still unlikely that the 
industry would be able to cover the largest of losses. Nevertheless, 
they may, in some cases, be sufficient to activate or reactivate private 
catastrophe insurance markets, as evidenced by two examples from 
the United States.18 
Evidence of the U.S. government helping the catastrophe 
insurance market is “provided by two features of the quasi-public 
agencies created to provide insurance coverage for wind damage 
(Florida) and earthquakes (California),”19 the Florida Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund and the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), 
respectively. 
First, the capital raised by each agency is available only for paying 
claims on its natural disaster coverage, since the quasi-public 
agencies are fully protected against any take-over attempts by 
private market firms .  .  . The accounting rules that otherwise 
preclude the earmarking of capital to specific expected catastrophe 
losses are hereby circumvented. Second, both agencies acquired 
special tax exemptions from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS, the 
US tax authority). Both of the above discussed accounting and 
taxation issues were hereby solved, and this was essential to their 
success in reviving activity in their respective natural disaster 
markets. However, it is intriguing that the US accounting and tax 
authorities appear unwilling to provide similar opportunities to 
private sector entities.20 
B. Providing Direct Compensation to Victims of Catastrophes 
In many situations, governments provide generous ex post 
compensation to victims of a catastrophe. The motivations for these 
interventions may vary. In some cases, it is argued that, out of 
solidarity, public funds should be used to provide (partial) 
compensation to victims.21 In other cases (this may be an especially 
strong argument in case of terrorist attacks), the government may be 
 
 18.  DWIGHT M. JAFFEE, REPORT ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE COVERAGE OF 
TERRORISM RISKS 21 (2004). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See Jef Van Langendonck, International Social Insurance for Natural Disasters?, in 
SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 183, 192–93 (Willem H. 
Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007). 
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best placed to take preventive measures.22 If these preventive 
measures have not been taken, direct compensation through public 
funds can provide alternative means for the government to live up to 
its responsibilities.  
Ex post compensation by the state can be ad hoc or of a 
structural nature. In the case of ad hoc compensation, “the 
government decides in each case, depending upon the size of the 
catastrophe, whether public funds will be made available or not”23 and 
if so, to what amount. In contrast, one example of a structural 
solution is the institution of a compensation fund for victims of 
natural catastrophes. 
Examples of structural direct compensation to victims of 
catastrophes can be found in many legal systems. Austria established 
a fund for catastrophes in 1996, which is “financed from income and 
corporate taxes and only covers part of the property damage suffered 
by victims of a catastrophe.”24 Belgium established a structural fund in 
1976;25 however, the importance of the fund has recently been 
seriously reduced due to the introduction of mandatory 
comprehensive insurance in Belgian legislation.26 Structural funds also 
exist in the United States, where: 
[t]he Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) distributes 
—inter alia to local governments—substantial amounts from its 
disaster relief fund  .  .  . [but] most of [the] federal assistance 
through FEMA is provided as emergency aid, hazard mitigation 
assistance, or public assistance to communities. It is therefore not 
comparable with a [structural] compensation fund that directly pays 
compensation for damage to victims, as is the case in Austria or 
Belgium.27 
There are also numerous examples of ad hoc solutions that 
provide immediate disaster relief for specific cases. A well-known 
example in the United States is the September 11th Victim 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Faure, supra note 3, at 353. 
 24.  Michael Faure, Comparative and Policy Conclusions, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 389, 415 (Michael 
Faure and Ton Hartlief eds., 2006), citing Dagmar Hinghofer-Szalkay & Bernhard A. Koch, 
Austria, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL APPROACH 7, 12 (Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief eds., 2006). 
 25.  See Isabelle C. Durant, Belgium, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF 
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 37, 59–69 (Michael Faure and Ton 
Hartlief eds., 2006). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Faure, supra note 24, at 417–18. 
Faure (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2013  7:51 PM 
192 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 23:185 
Compensation Fund.28 The fact that compensation is provided on an 
ad hoc rather than a structural basis does not mean that the amounts 
of compensation will be lower. 
For example, in Germany after the “flood of the century” of the 
river Elbe in 2002, ad hoc compensation was provided through the 
so-called Flutopferhilfesolidaritätsgesetz, which provided a total 
amount of compensation of 8.1 billion euros. Also, in Italy the 
amounts paid by the Italian government as ad hoc compensation 
are on average 3.5 to 4 billion euros per year as a consequence of 
which a relevant share of the states’ yearly budget is devoted to 
restoring damage as a result of catastrophes.29 
The Dutch government intervened with ad hoc compensation to 
the victims of the fireworks explosion in Enschede30 and the large café 
fire in Volendam. The young Volendam victims received a total of 
€30.1 million from the state, amounting to about €150,000 per victim, 
whereas the Enschede victims received only €120,000 per person.31 In 
the end, the national government in both instances not only provided 
compensation for the direct costs—as was initially the idea—but also 
provided large amounts of ad hoc compensation. Reports on (more or 
less generous) ad hoc ex post compensation have also come from 
many other countries.32 The efficiency of this type of government 
intervention will be further analyzed in Part II.A. 
 
 28.  See Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL 
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHIES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 7, 12 
(Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief eds., 2006); see also MARSHALL S. SHAPO, COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 105–25 (2005); Kenneth P. Nolan & Jeanne M. O’Grady, The 
Victim Compensation Fund—Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 
(2003); George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 527 (2003); Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the 
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (2003). 
 29.  MICHAEL FAURE & KLAUS HEINE, CAN EUROPEAN STATE AID CONTROL LEARN 
FROM THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTROUS CRISES? 7, prepared for Ausschuss für 
Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik Verein für Socialpolitik (2010), available at 
http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/06/vs/Tagungen/2010/Heine-Faure_Referat.pdf (citation 
omitted). 
 30.  See Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, The Netherlands, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 195, 219–20 (Michael 
Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006). 
 31.  GUIDO SUURMOND, ENFORCING FIRE SAFETY IN THE CATERING INDUSTRY: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 261 (Leiden Univ. Press, 2008). 
 32.  For a comparative overview, see generally the contributions in FINANCIAL 
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 
(Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006). 
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C. Providing Mandatory Comprehensive Insurance 
In some cases, the government does not intervene to cure 
problems on the supply side of disaster insurance, but instead 
attempts to remedy information failures on the demand side. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that even in countries where 
disaster insurance is widely available (such as in the United States 
and in Europe), individuals tend not to make sufficient use of it, 
resulting in dramatic cases of underinsurance. This became apparent 
after the “flood of the century” of the river Elbe in Germany33 and 
after Hurricane Katrina in the United States.34 
There are several reasons for this low demand for disaster 
insurance. First, low-probability events like natural disasters are 
systematically misjudged,35 resulting in an “it will not happen to me” 
attitude.36 Second, there is equally strong empirical evidence that 
people ex ante prefer large uncertain losses over smaller certain 
losses. Insurance is considered an investment; however, as the 
potential victim—for example, a homeowner—is confronted with the 
certain loss of a premium and a low expectation of a return on the 
“investment” during his lifetime, demand for this investment is low.37 
Third, literature indicates that ex post government relief reduces 
incentives to purchase insurance coverage.38 
The limited demand for disaster coverage can lead to legislative 
action to stimulate the availability of (affordable) insurance. In some 
 
 33.  See, e.g., Alfred Endres, et al., ‘Land unter!’ Ein Institutionenökonomische 
Zwischenruf, 29 LIST FORUM FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS UND FINANZPOLITIK 284 (2003); see also 
Ulrich Magnus, Germany, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 119, 124 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006) (noting 
that because the magnitude of losses from the flood exceeded capacity, the solidarity of the 
public was required to provide adequate compensation); Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. 
Wagner, In the Aftermath of Dresden: New Directions in German Flood Insurance, 29 THE 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 154, 154–55 (proposing an alternative mandatory form of 
natural hazard insurance based on pooling). 
 34.  See generally ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 
(Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2006). 
 35.  See Paul Slovic, Howard Kunreuther & Gilbert White, Decision Processes, Rationality 
and Adjustment to Natural Hazards, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 187, 187 (2000) (discussing 
decisionmaking responses to natural disasters in a technological society). 
 36.  Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance, 12 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 171, 175 (1996). 
 37.  Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance 
Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 237 (1977). 
 38.  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 3, at 293–96; see also Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking 
Disaster Policy, 23 REG. 40, 41–46 (2000) (demonstrating the effects of moral hazard and 
adverse selection). 
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cases, this goes as far as imposing mandatory coverage for the 
consequences of catastrophes. The economic rationale in favor of this 
system will be further developed in Part II.B. 
France provides one of the best-known examples of this type of 
intervention. Through the Act of July 13, 1982, France created a duty 
in its “code des assurances” to provide coverage for the consequences 
of natural disasters in addition to “voluntarily purchased first-party 
insurance policies covering damage against property, as well as first-
party car insurance policies covering the insured value of the car and 
property left in it.”39 This mandatory additional disaster coverage (in 
other words, catastrophe insurance must be bundled with ordinary car 
and home insurance) was introduced because such damage would 
normally be considered uninsurable.40 Insurers are only liable for such 
damages if the government declares a certain incident to be a natural 
disaster.41 The coverage for natural catastrophes is: 
[A] percentage of the insurance premium paid by each insured and 
is decided upon by the Government, in the form of a Decree. In 
practice, this comes down to the ‘national solidarity principle,’ since 
every citizen and business firm will pay the same extra-charge rate 
whatever his or her exposure to the natural catastrophe risk  . . . . 
Apart from the additional insurance premium, also the applicable 
and mandatory deductibles are fixed in a Decree.42 
This French example of a mandatory comprehensive coverage 
system has recently been followed in Belgium. Through the Acts of 
May 21, 2003 and September 17, 2005, a mandatory extension for 
natural disasters (flooding, earthquakes, impoundment of public 
sewers, landslides, or subsidence) was added to the voluntarily 
purchased fire insurance coverage for so-called simple risks.43 As a 
result, ninety to ninety-five percent of the Belgian population has 
now been insured against such natural-catastrophe risks. “The insurer 
can investigate the natural hazard risk for every individual case and 
 
 39. Act No. 82-600 of 13 July 1982 on the Indemnification of Victims of Natural 
Catastrophes, JORF 2242 (1982); BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 303. 
 40.  See BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 303 (offering an explanation of the French system 
where first-party insurance automatically includes natural disasters); see also Michel Cannarsa, 
Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moréteau, France, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF 
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH, (Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief eds., 
2006) (offering a detailed description of mandatory disaster coverage). 
 41.  See generally Olivier Moréteau, Policing the Compensation of Victims of Catastrophes: 
Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE 
AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 199–218 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2006). 
 42.  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 306–07 (citation omitted). 
 43.  See id. at 247–60 (describing in detail the Belgian system). 
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will adjust the extra premium accordingly .  .  .  . The final premium 
will hence differ in function of the real risk.”44 The introduction of 
such a mandatory insurance scheme for disasters has also been 
proposed in German legal scholarship.45 A variety of legislative 
proposals with the same aim have also been introduced in Italy.46 
D. Government-Provided Insurance: Government Acting as Primary 
Insurer47 
In the most extreme form of intervention in victim 
compensation, the government serves as the primary insurer, taking 
on all insurance functions, including defining the coverage, setting the 
prices, and bearing the risk. Such government intervention can take 
two forms: 1) complete and free government insurance; and 2) full 
government insurance by a quasi-public entity operating under 
constraints imposed by legislation.48 The former empowers a 
government, which defines the coverage, bears the risk, and plans to 
finance the costs from general tax revenues.49 Equitable 
considerations are one of the main motivations for this type of 
government intervention.50 However, complete government insurance 
also reduces the incentive for citizens to mitigate their actual losses in 
case of catastrophe.51 The second type of full government insurance 
involves a quasi-public entity, which is empowered to set premiums 
and bear the catastrophe risks under voluntary coverage. Legislation 
can then require large initial capital contributions to the agency from 
private insurance firms, which are thereby relieved of the need to 
 
 44.  Id. at 256. 
 45.  See, e.g., Endres et al., supra note 33, at 284–94; see also Schwarze & Wagner, supra 
note 33, at 163–67 (arguing that general mandatory insurance would protect against a wide 
variety of mega-disasters and force individuals to buy their own insurance instead of relying on 
government aid and donations). 
 46. See Alberto Monti & Filippo Andrea Chiaves, Italy, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHIES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 146, 186–91 (Michael 
Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006) (describing how the Italian government presented a bill in 
1999 which would regulate all natural disaster insurance, and in 2001 Senator Manfredi 
presented a bill which would regulate private citizens’ relationships with private disaster 
insurance companies). 
 47.  Part I.D borrows from a book by of one of the authors, see BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, 
at 190. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted. 
 48.  See JAFFEE, supra note 18, at 24. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Jack Hirshleifer, War Damage Insurance, 35 REV. ECON. & STAT. 144, 144–53 
(1953). 
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provide direct coverage. As a result, private insurance companies may 
and do compete with the government. However, this may crowd out 
wholly private competitors, who may eventually only offer coverage 
for low-risk locations and structures. 
As mentioned above, equitable considerations supply the main 
motivation for providing complete and free government insurance.52 
This motivation “would seem appropriate when the losses incurred 
are the result of a common national policy such as a war.”53 Some 
countries, such as Israel and Northern Ireland, therefore offer 
coverage for losses due to terrorism to all persons without direct 
cost.54 The government bears the entire risk, which is funded from 
general tax revenues.55 
In California, the CEA,56 created after the 1994 Northridge 
Earthquake, assumes primary responsibility for bearing earthquake 
risk, and the primary insurer plays an exclusively administrative role.57 
The CEA thus “provides an example of full government insurance.”58 
The CEA is a quasi-public entity empowered to set premiums and 
bear risks under three constraints: 1) legislation determines the 
classes of real-estate losses which may and may not be covered;59 2) 
legislation requires premiums be set on an “actuarial basis” (though, 
in practice, the quoted CEA premiums have been “tempered,” 
moderating the price differences across regions);60 and 3) “legislation 
require[s] large initial capital contributions from []private insurance 
firms, which [are] thereby relieved of the need to provide direct 
coverage. The legislation allows CEA to purchase reinsurance, but 
denies CEA to have access to public funds.”61 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), administered by 
FEMA, is another example of government assuming the role of 
 
 52.  JAFFEE, supra note 18, at 24. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  The reader will notice that we mentioned the CEA in Part I.A as an example of relying 
on the private insurance market and here as government as primary insurer. The reason is that 
the CEA still relies on private insurers, but they merely administer the risk; risk-bearing was 
taken over by the government. 
 57.  See FAURE & HEINE, supra note 29, at 9–10. 
 58.  Id. at 9. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
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primary risk insurer.62 The NFIP can be regarded as a variant on the 
CEA: like the state of California, the U.S. federal government has 
stepped in and assumed the risk of financial loss associated with a 
disastrous flood. The NFIP, created under the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1968,63 is a joint private industry and federal 
government cooperative program enabling homeowners and 
businesses in participating communities to purchase subsidized 
insurance protection against losses from flooding.64 Subsidized 
insurance is provided to properties that were in existence at the time 
the area in which they are located was identified as a Special Flood 
Hazard Area (SFHA).65 The SFHA consists of land subject to a one 
percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year. Such areas 
are commonly referred to as subject to the one-hundred-year flood.66 
“In exchange for the availability of subsidized insurance for existing 
buildings, communities are required to protect new construction and 
substantially improved structures through the adoption and 
enforcement of community floodplain management ordinances” or 
regulations.67 The NFIP thus consists of a quid pro quo arrangement: 
the federal government makes insurance available to community 
residents at subsidized rates in exchange for the adoption and 
enforcement of floodplain regulatory ordinances by community 
officials. 
E. Government-Provided Reinsurance: Government as a Reinsurer of 
Last Resort68 
Under this approach to government involvement in catastrophe 
insurance, the state assumes at least part of the risk for losses from 
 
 62.  FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 3 (2002). 
 63.  Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub.L.No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  The one-hundred-year flood represents a magnitude and frequency of flooding that 
has a statistical probability of being equaled or exceeded in any given year, or, stated 
alternatively, the one-hundred-year flood has—ironically (and reflective of public misperception 
of flood risks)—a 26 percent (or one in four) chance of occurring over the life of a thirty-year 
mortgage. The one-percent-annual-chance flood was chosen because it provides a high level of 
protection while not imposing overly stringent requirements or excessive costs on property 
owners. See Raymond J. Burby, Flood Insurance And Floodplain Management: The US 
Experience, 3 ENV’T HAZARDS 111–22 (2001). 
 67.  FEMA, supra note 62, at 3. 
 68.  Part I.E borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see BRUGGEMAN, supra 
note 8, at 189. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted 
Faure (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2013  7:51 PM 
198 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 23:185 
catastrophes. Although this approach requires government 
intervention (since the private insurance market cannot provide 
adequate catastrophe insurance coverage), the underlying philosophy 
is that private insurance should continue to play a significant role in 
allocating compensation for victims of catastrophes. Thus, this option 
usually takes the form of a multi-layered insurance program that is 
normally administered by private insurance companies that sell the 
insurance, collect premiums, and pay claims. 
In one example of a multilayered insurance program, the first 
layer of (small) catastrophe losses is borne by the victims themselves 
to provide loss-reducing incentives and prevent moral hazard. Private 
insurance companies cover the second layer of catastrophe losses with 
risk-based premiums and coverage depending on the surplus of the 
insurer, its current portfolio, and its ability to diversify across risks. 
The third layer of losses is covered by reinsurance and catastrophe 
bonds, which are to be acquired by the primary insurers. Once these 
funds are exhausted, a government reinsurance program covers the 
fourth layer of risk, consisting of extreme losses. The government is, 
in other words, involved as a reinsurer of last resort. 
If the government acts as a reinsurer of last resort, it mainly 
provides reinsurance at the highest risk levels, while primary insurers 
and reinsurers retain responsibility for some or all of the lower risk 
levels. The sharing of risk with private industry is achieved through a 
mandatory deductible limit at the lowest risk level and through 
coinsurance at intermediate risk levels. Various features of a 
government acting as a reinsurer of last resort can be considered, 
including, for example, the price of premiums for the government’s 
reinsurance facility, mandatory or voluntary participation in the plan, 
establishment of the maximum retained risks and risk-coverage 
limitations, and the possibility of incorporating a sunset provision. 
In any case, government involvement in insurance coverage for 
catastrophic events does not function like traditional insurance for 
the following reasons:69 (1) where premiums are charged, they may be 
explicitly subsidized or set based on incomplete measures of the risks 
involved, which may result in an implicit subsidy, even in the absence 
of clear statutory intent to subsidize the coverage; (2) the 
government’s insurance commitment may extend over multiple time 
 
 69.  See SOPHIE M. KORCZYK, NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. CO., INSURING THE 
UNINSURABLE: PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN CASES 
OF EXTREME RISK 1–2 (2005). 
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periods, allowing the government to recoup past losses through future 
premiums or other revenues; (3) the government may have a unique 
capacity to mitigate risks, for example by enforcing floodplain 
management standards or conducting financial examinations of 
insured financial institutions; (4) the government may provide back-
up coverage financed through general government revenues rather 
than premiums paid by the insured; and (5) the government may act 
as a monopoly in the insurance market, giving rise to low-quality 
services with low prices, which may impede the provision of 
preventive incentives that should be embedded in good insurance 
policies.70 
A multi-layered insurance program, with the government acting 
as a reinsurer of last resort, has been proposed by Robert Litan71 and 
Professor Howard Kunreuther72 for insuring catastrophe losses in the 
United States. 
The current schemes for terrorism insurance in France 
(GAREAT), Germany (Extremus), the UK (Pool Re), the 
Netherlands (Dutch Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company (NHT)), 
and the United States (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)) all 
have features of governments acting as a reinsurer of last resort.73 
Pool Re provides an example in the U.K.: 
The British government created Pool Re as a reinsurer of last 
resort in 1993 after private reinsurers reduced their coverage for 
risks from terrorism following bombings by the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA). With Pool Re, which is mutually owned by 
participating insurers, primary insurers may reinsure their risks 
from terrorism for commercial property losses and losses from 
business interruption .  .  . Pool Re sets premiums on the basis of 
the amount of insurance coverage, geographic location, and other 
risk factors. 
 
 70.  But see infra Part II.C (showing how insurance provided by a state monopoly is not 
bad under some circumstances). 
 71.  ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS INST., POLICY BRIEF #150: PREPARING FOR FUTURE 
“KATRINAS” 6–7 (2006) (proposing a federal office that formally insures citizens for mega 
catastrophes). 
 72.  Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster 
Insurance? in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 196 (Ronald 
J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006); Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion: 
Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101, 109–13 (2006). 
 73.  MICHAEL FAURE & KLAUS HEINE, INSURANCE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE WAY 
FORWARD, proposal submitted to 29th Annual Conference of the European Association for Law 
and Economics (Sept. 2012) (citing DWIGHT M. JAFFEE, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND 
ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE COVERAGE OF 
TERRORISM RISKS 26–31 (2004)). 
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 However, primary insurers are free to set the price of terrorism 
coverage they offer.74 Pool Re must reinsure all offered policies; 
coverage begins after primary insurers pay roughly the first $150,000 
in claims.75 In turn, the British government reinsures Pool Re and 
agrees to guarantee any loans or lines of credit that the pool might 
seek.76 “Once the pool’s reserves exceed $1.5 billion, it will pay to the 
government the greater of 10 percent of the net premiums remitted 
each year or a payment geared to the government’s past losses.”77 
Because the system has been self-supporting, the state has never had 
to intervene as a reinsurer of last resort.78 
F. Government Simply Providing an Additional Insurance Layer 
Under another approach, the government finances catastrophic 
damages through an additional insurance layer, outside of the 
insurance market and on an ex post level, above the insurers’ own 
financing. This scheme aims to supplement compensation from 
insurers (if needed) and thus to maximize the protection of victims in 
case damages exceed certain limits.79 Thus, under this approach the 
state merely guarantees an additional layer of compensation and does 
little to facilitate insurability.80 
The nuclear liability conventions of the 1960s provided for a 
multi-layered compensation system.81 The first layer of the 
compensation is payable by the licensee of the nuclear power plant 
responsible for the incident (and covered by its insurance), the 
second, much larger, layer is provided by the state, and the third layer 
is provided by all the contracting parties.82 “The rights of victims of a 
nuclear accident to be compensated for losses are governed by 
 
 74.  CONG. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR DISASTERS 50 (2002), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/37xx/doc3787/09-20-
federalreinsurance.pdf. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See id. 
 79.  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 203. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Michael G. Faure, Insurability of Damage Caused by Climate Change: A Commentary, 
155 PENN. L. REV. 1875, 1886 (2007). 
 82.  Id. 
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international conventions,”83 such as the Convention of Paris of July 
29, 1960, the Convention of Brussels of January 31, 1963, and the 
Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damages of May 21, 
1963.84 “The conventions make the licensee of a nuclear plant strictly 
liable and introduce compulsory insurance. However, the maximum 
amount of compensation is limited, and short statutes of limitations 
apply.”85 The conventions state that the signatory nations should 
provide for minimum compensation to victims, but, within the limits 
set by the convention, the nations are free to set the maximum 
amount of compensation.86 This regime has been changed by a 
protocol of 2004 which has, however, not yet entered into force.87 
G. New Forms of Government Intervention88 
Responsible governments aim to offer financial compensation in 
case insurance and reinsurance markets suffer from surplus depletion 
following a catastrophic event. As discussed above, the government 
can act, inter alia, as a primary insurer or as a reinsurer of last resort. 
The latter role can be further limited to losses that exceed some 
threshold of insurance industry losses. The government thereby 
auctions excess-of-loss (XOL) contracts to insurers and reinsurers. 
The government can also act as a lender of last resort. 
 
 83.  Michael Faure, Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear 
Accidents: Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, 2 EURO. J. LAW 
& ECON. 21, 21 (1995). 
 84.  See id. at 24–25. 
 85.  Id. at 21. 
 86.  See generally id. (arguing that a mutual pooling system, whereby all nuclear plants 
share the costs of an accident, could be fitted into a revision of the Paris and Vienna 
Conventions on liability for nuclear accidents); Michael Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, 
Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International 
Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y REV. 220, 220–86 (2008) (comparing 
the evolution of the American nuclear compensation scheme under the Price-Anderson Act to 
international compensation schemes); Göran Skogh, A European Nuclear Accident Pool, 33 
THE GENEVA PAPERS 274, 274–87 (2008) (explaining how compensation to victims would be 
better organized by an organization like the European  Union, which could hold states strictly 
liable, as opposed to the current system where compensation is based on the OECD Paris 
Convention and the UN Vienna Convention and where a plant is strictly liable but victims are 
left without compensation if the plant is insolvent). 
 87.  See Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, 
OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention-
ratification.html (showing the latest status of ratifications or accessions). 
 88.  Parts I.G, I.G.1, and I.G.2 borrow from a book written by one of the authors, see 
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 190–92, 205–06. To ease readability, quotation marks have been 
omitted. 
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1. Federal Excess-of-Loss Reinsurance Contracts 
Economist Christopher Lewis and Professor Kevin Murdock 
propose a form of federal reinsurance that complements existing 
insurance and reinsurance products, focuses on diversifying large 
disaster losses over time, and also limits the federal government’s 
exposure to additional losses.89 Specifically, the federal government 
would sell per-occurrence XOL contracts to private insurers and 
reinsurers, in which both the coverage layer and the fixed payout of 
the contract would be based on aggregate insurance-industry losses, 
and not on company-specific losses. These XOL contracts would be 
available for qualified insurance companies, pools, and reinsurers, 
and would cover industry losses in the twenty-five to fifty billion 
dollar layer of coverage—or any layer unavailable in the private 
market. Lewis and Murdock further suggest for these auctions to be 
conducted subject to a reservation price sufficient to support the 
expected loss and expense costs under the contracts as well as to 
include a risk premium that would encourage private-market 
crowding-out of government reinsurance. If a catastrophe occurred 
that would trigger payment under the contracts, the federal 
government would finance the loss payments by issuing bonds. 
The rationale for government provision of these contracts is that 
the capacity of private insurance and reinsurance markets is currently 
inadequate to provide coverage for losses of this magnitude. The 
government has a superior ability to diversify risks across time 
through the exercise of federal borrowing power. While it is costly for 
private insurers to raise additional capital following a loss shock, 
federal debt is viewed as more secure and thus the government would 
not find its cost of capital increasing significantly in the wake of a 
catastrophe. The proposed XOL contracts would help to solve the 
problems in insurance markets while potentially reducing the federal 
government’s role in providing disaster relief payments to property 
owners following a catastrophe. The contracts do not provide a 
subsidy to insurers but instead are designed to be self-supporting in 
terms of expected value—that is, the contracts are to be priced so that 
the expected cost to the government is zero.  
 
 89.  Christopher M. Lewis & Kevin C. Murdock, The Role of Government Contracts in 
Discretionary Reinsurance Markets for Natural Disasters, 63 J. RISK & INSURANCE 567, 567 
(1996); David Cummins, Christopher M. Lewis, & Richard D. Phillips, Pricing Excess-of-Loss 
Reinsurance Contracts against Catastrophic Loss, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC RISK 
93 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999). 
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Both authors argue that this form of limited per-occurrence XOL 
contract is the preferred reinsurance mechanism for the government 
because it would expand the capacity and stability of the catastrophe 
insurance industry, while limiting the taxpayers’ exposure to the 
insured catastrophic event. Furthermore, a targeted and risk-specific 
government reinsurance program has the advantage of supplying 
reinsurance without imposing large liability on the government. 
Moreover, by offering a complementary reinsurance vehicle that does 
not compete with the private sector, efficient coverage can be 
provided to the private insurance markets whenever feasible. Further 
advantages include that the federal government may carry less of an 
insolvency risk and that the risk premiums required by the 
government reinsurer for upper layers of catastrophe risk will be 
significantly below the premiums required by private reinsurers. The 
key advantage of the auction device is that the private insurance firms 
play a major role in determining the price they must pay to obtain the 
government’s reinsurance contract, in contrast to the existing options 
in which the price is administratively determined by the government. 
A potential drawback of the auctioning of XOL reinsurance 
contracts “may be in the details, since the government must 
determine all of the auction conditions, including how much 
aggregate coverage to offer, and the conditions under which new 
‘tranche’ will be available, if at all, in the future. Additionally, since 
the contracts would most likely include triggers and payouts based on 
industry-wide losses, individual firms would face basis risk.”90 
2. Government as Lender of Last Resort 
Professors Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell have proposed the 
introduction of a temporary loan scheme for catastrophe insurers.91 
They argue that the financial system is no stranger to a program of 
temporary government loans. Central banks, for example, have (at 
least if one disregards the recent financial crisis) long guaranteed the 
stability of the commercial banking system by acting as temporary 
“lenders of last resort.” (Of course, there are differences between 
banks and the government, but the authors argue that these are one 
 
 90.  See JAFFEE, supra note 18, at 37–38. 
 91.  DWIGHT JAFFEE & THOMAS RUSSELL, APRIA, FINANCING CATASTROPHE 
INSURANCE: A NEW PROPOSAL 6–7 (2006); DWIGHT JAFFEE & THOMAS RUSSELL, NBER 
INSURANCE PROJECT WORKSHOP, EXTREME EVENTS AND THE MARKET FOR TERRORIST 
INSURANCE  24–25 (2002); Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Should Governments Provide 
Catastrophe Insurance?, 3 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1, 4–6 (2006). 
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of degree and not of kind.) Suppose, then, that public policy makers 
decide to extend the lender-of-last-resort function to providers of 
catastrophe insurance. As an insurance company which has just paid 
out a large claim does not have the quantity or quality of assets of a 
solvent bank, the public lending agency will need to offer unsecured 
loans. This, in turn, will require that the public lender be the leading 
creditor in the event of a bankruptcy. Under this approach, taxpayers 
will bear credit risk, but this risk is likely to be smaller than the risk 
they would bear if the government were to itself provide direct 
insurance or reinsurance. 
The purpose of such loans is to provide insurers with time to 
access equity capital markets. Thus, the loans must be of short 
duration, two to three years at maximum. Moreover, as the loans are 
intended to overcome the problem of non-availability of capital, there 
is no need to subsidize insurers, and the loans should be offered at 
market price. Also, since the explicit purpose of the loans is to 
temporarily provide policy-writing capacity, the borrowing insurance 
company should be explicitly required to raise equity capital and 
provide additional coverage during the loan period. The loan 
agreement could explicitly provide additional incentives for firms to 
do so, for example, by lowering the loan rate as the firms raise their 
equity bases. 
II. STIMULATING INSURABILITY: A NORMATIVE LAW-AND-
ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 
Part I described the various ways in which government can and 
does intervene in compensating victims of catastrophes. In this part, 
we will provide a normative law-and-economics analysis of the 
various forms of government intervention and assess their economic 
efficiency.92 First, in Part II.A, we will show that many law-and-
 
 92.  The relatively modest form of government intervention in which the government 
merely supports the private market (through, for example, tax exemptions), see supra Part I.A., 
does not need further discussion for the simple reason that the government in such cases does 
not run any financial risk. The new forms of government intervention discussed in Part I.G will 
also not be discussed any further. These interesting models have been suggested in the 
literature, but they do not yet exist in practice and are therefore less appealing as subjects for 
further analysis. The role of the government in simply providing an additional risk layer, see 
supra Part I.F, will also not be discussed in more detail because government intervention in this 
case is not related to stimulating insurability. Instead, in such cases, the government merely 
provides supplementary compensation to the extent that the money provided as a result of the 
(limited) liability of the licensee of a nuclear power plant does not suffice to compensate the 
victims. In that respect, the government’s role is comparable to providing direct compensation 
to victims of catastrophes—there is no relationship to insurance in either of the cases. 
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economics scholars have described ex post relief as problematic. 
Second, in Part II.B, we will argue that introducing mandatory 
comprehensive insurance may be a better solution. Third, in Parts 
II.C and II.D, we will focus on the potential role for the government 
in insuring emerging catastrophe risks as a primary insurer and as a 
reinsurer of last resort. 
A. Direct Compensation to Victims of Catastrophes: Government as 
Santa Claus 
1. Political Inefficiencies 
One way for the government to stimulate compensation for 
victims of catastrophes is to simply take over the compensation 
function and provide ex post relief to victims. As we described 
above,93 this type of ex post relief can take different forms—it can 
consist of a disaster compensation fund94 or simply of ad hoc 
compensation whereby the government decides on the basis of the 
nature and scope of the disaster how much relief to provide. Usually, 
these forms of ex post relief provide lump-sum payments to victims 
and are financed by the taxpayers. 
However, a distinction should be made between government 
intervention in the prevention of catastrophes—for example, by 
building dikes against flooding—which usually takes place ex ante, 
and a role of government in providing compensation, which takes 
place ex post.  
A positive aspect of ex post government intervention is that 
“[t]he prospect of large-scale payouts in the aftermath of major losses 
might . . . encourage the government to take cost-benefit justified 
precautions long before disaster strikes.”95 This argument is 
particularly strong in the case of terrorism. The goal of terrorist 
attacks is often to disrupt society, and ex post relief may help restore 
 
Government provision of an additional insurance layer is thus susceptible to roughly the same 
law-and-economics objections as the provision of direct compensation; the only difference is 
that when the government provides only an additional risk layer, at least some compensation is 
still provided by the liable insurer. 
 93.  See supra Introduction 
 94.  See, e.g., Dagmar & Koch, supra note 24, at 7–12 (discussing the 
Kataztrophenfondsgesetz in Austria, an administrative fund with state aid contributions for 
catastrophe indemnification); Durant, supra note 25, at 38 (outlining the current patchwork 
system for compensation in Belgium, which includes government intervention). 
 95.  See Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and Crime, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 268, 310 (2003). 
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the public trust. Moreover, terrorists may adopt adaptive strategies to 
which governments can potentially react better than individuals—
there is little one can expect from civilians as far as taking preventive 
measures is concerned. The same is obviously true of large-scale 
infrastructural works that are necessary to prevent catastrophes. 
These are typically public goods that would not be provided through 
private action and may hence require government intervention. 
Professor Ben Depoorter has argued that politicians may receive 
too little reward from ex ante disaster-management policies and that 
these policies may be undersupplied as a result.96 The problem is 
exacerbated because political benefits of planning activities may be 
shared with other levels of government.97 In contrast, the political 
reward for ex post compensation may be very strong, and ex post 
relief is thus likely to be oversupplied.98 This has also been confirmed 
in other literature. Public choice theory shows that governments will 
always tend to intervene when the number of victims is large.99 
Potential victims are, after all, voters, and governments will try to 
seduce the largest number of electors in order to gain or maintain 
power.100 “A political [and strategic] interest might thus be hidden 
behind the argument of victim[] protection.”101 Second, public choice 
theory also demonstrates that public intervention is costly. State 
organization of compensation financing—especially through public 
insurance pools—can be analogized to a bureaucracy.102 In that 
respect, Professor Gordon Tullock shows that this type of scheme 
might suffer from economic inefficiency.103 This inefficiency appears 
to be due to internal rent-seeking activities, and, in case of public 
 
 96.  Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply And Demand of Disaster 
Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 112–13 (2006). 
 97.  Id. at 110. 
 98.  Id. at 104 (2006) (describing how this may have been the case after Hurricane Katrina). 
 99.  See Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 167, 171–73 (1991) (arguing that government relief for risk actually “distorts” 
incentives because it externalizes the cost of individual actions); see also Epstein, supra note 3, 
at 293–96 (saying that, while viewed ex post the marginal dollar spent in relief after a 
catastrophe has greater value to the recipients than it does to the tax-payers, viewed ex ante 
such relief is less clearly efficient); Role for Government, supra note 4, at 49–50 (discussing the 
crises with private insurance in the United States following the 2001 terrorist attacks). 
 100.  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 198. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 
224, 230 (1967). 
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insurance pools, due to capture of a monopolistic profit.104 Indeed, 
economist Thomas Gerrett and Professor Russell Sobel showed that 
disaster expenditures by FEMA are mostly politically motivated: 
“[s]tates [that are] politically important to the president have a higher 
rate of disaster declaration by the president, and disaster 
expenditures are higher in states having congressional representation 
on FEMA oversight committees.”105 Hence, Gerrett and Sobel argue 
that “nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated politically rather 
than by need.”106  
An additional problem arises when government compensation is 
provided for victims of technological disasters—the compensation 
favors not only the victims but also the injurers. Indeed, since 
governments pay for the consequences of the risk generated by the 
injurers, the injurers are relieved from the compensation charge. This 
discharge corresponds to exoneration, thus creating a double 
inefficiency. On the one hand, since injurers do not have to pay 
compensation (partly or fully), government intervention has a 
subsidizing character. This implicit subsidy might disturb the injurers’ 
incentives to care. Professors Karine Fiore and Michael Faure 
illustrate this argument for the nuclear industry in France (and 
elsewhere in Europe), where the state pays for a large share of 
compensation in case of an accident.107 Of course, this problem does 
not arise in the case of natural catastrophes or terrorist activities, 
where no solvent injurer can be identified. 
2. Incentive Problems 
This part lists additional problems—other than the inefficiencies 
discussed above—that law-and-economics scholars have identified 
with respect to government provision of ex post relief to disaster 
victims. 
 
 104.  Obviously, the severity of the criticisms partially depends upon the nature of the 
arrangement. To the extent that government relief can be structured to still provide some 
incentives to the victims (for example, by including deductibles or by differentiating the amount 
of compensation based on preventive measures taken by the victim) and that financing can to 
some extent still be risk-based (although that is seldom the case), the criticisms may be less 
serious. 
 105.  Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster 
Payments, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 496, 496 (2003). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis of the Nuclear Liability 
Subsidy, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 432–36 (2009). 
Faure (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2013  7:51 PM 
208 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 23:185 
First, since lump-sum government-relief payments usually do not 
relate to risk, no incentives are provided to potential victims to take 
effective preventive measures. Of course, whether it is realistic for the 
victims to take preventive measures will very much depend upon the 
nature of the disaster. Preventive measures that require a significant 
ex ante investment of infrastructure will, for the public-good reason 
discussed above, be primarily undertaken by government. For 
example, taking structural measures to protect a country against 
tsunamis or against terrorism risk is primarily a government task. 
Individual potential victims can certainly take some protective 
measures, not so much to prevent a disaster, but rather to limit the 
damage it may cause. For example, flood damage can obviously be 
prevented by not locating buildings in flood-prone areas. 
Nevertheless, the government may be best situated to know the 
location of these flood-prone areas and may use zoning regulations to 
limit construction in those areas. Additionally, even when exposed to 
flood risks, victims can still take preventive measures—for example, 
in the case of flooding, by removing the most valuable household 
objects from the cellar or ground floor. These measures may be 
relatively limited compared to the impact of infrastructural works that 
the government could undertake, but they remain important. The 
problem—also called the “charity hazard” by Paul Raschky and 
Professor Hannelore Weck-Hannemann108 and as defined by 
Professors Mark Browne and Robert Hoyt109—is that ex post relief by 
the government will not provide incentives to take those appropriate 
preventive measures. The literature thus suggests that, via risk 
differentiation, competitive insurance markets are better able to deal 
with moral hazard and adverse selection.110 
A second problem is that victims may be counting on 
government compensation, which may create an incentive not to 
 
 108.  See Paul A. Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, Charity Hazard—A Real 
Hazard to Natural Disaster Insurance, 7 NAT. HAZARDS 321, 322 (2007). 
 109.   See id. at 322; see also Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for Flood 
Insurance: Empirical Evidence, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 291, 293 (2000) (defining charity 
hazard as “the tendency of an individual at risk not to procure insurance or other risk financing 
as a result of a reliance on expected charity from others such as friends, family, community, non-
profit organizations, or a government emergency program”); Tracy Lewis & David Nickerson, 
Self-Insurance Against Natural Disasters, 16 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 209, 209–10 (1989). 
 110.   George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss, 
12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 222 (1996). 
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purchase insurance, since victims can simply free-ride on the State.111 
In the words of Professor Christian Gollier, “[s]olidarity kills market 
insurance.”112 Stephen Coate has linked the lack of insurance to the 
generosity of the government.113 An experimental study of crop 
insurance in the Netherlands also showed that the willingness of 
producers to purchase private insurance (supported by the 
government) was significantly negatively influenced by their belief 
about the availability of government-supplied disaster relief in the 
future.114 A similar conclusion was also recently reached based on 
empirical research comparing compensation mechanisms available in 
different countries after the August 2005 flood in Austria, 
Switzerland, and the German state of Bavaria.115 The study argues 
that there was a substantial charity hazard leading to lower amounts 
of insurance purchased in Austria, where a disaster fund was 
available.116 Participation in flood insurance was higher in Bavaria, 
although it was the highest in the Swiss canton of Grison, which had 
public insurance and mandatory participation.117  
Negative distributional effects are a related problem, as some 
victims—who, for example, purchased houses at low prices in flood-
prone areas—may free-ride on other individuals (the general 
taxpayers) who finance the ex post relief.118 
Ex post government compensation is therefore generally seen as 
problematic by law-and-economics scholars. This criticism is nicely 
expressed by the title of a work by Professor Richard Epstein, which 
characterizes ex post relief as “Catastrophic Responses to 
 
 111.   See, e.g., Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 281; see also Kaplow, supra note 99, at 
167, 173 (exploring the notion that government relief may have an adverse effect on private 
incentives to purchase insurance). 
 112.  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 207 (citing Christian Gollier, Some Aspects of the 
Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, CATASTROPHIC RISKS & INSURANCE 13, 25 (2005)). 
 113.   Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma and Government Transfer Policy, 
85 AM. ECON. REV. 46, 46 (1995). 
 114.  See Marcel A.P.M. van Asseldonk, Miranda P.M. Meuwissen & Ruud B.M. Huirne, 
Belief in Disaster Relief and the Demand for a Public-Private Insurance Programme, 24 REV. 
AGRIC. ECON 196 (2002) (discussing how free government relief in the past disincentivized 
farmers in the Dutch crop insurance program). 
 115.  See Paul A. Raschky et al., Risikotransfersysteme für Naturkatastrophen in 
Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz—Ein theoretischer und empirischer Vergleich, 77 
VIERTELJAHRSHEFTE ZUR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG 53 (2008) (comparing “risk transfer,” or 
insurance, systems in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland after they were affected by floods in 
2005). 
 116.  Id. at 66–67. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 207. 
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Catastrophic Risks.”119 Weighing these disadvantages against the 
potential benefits of such an approach—that is, providing incentives 
to the government to take measures aimed at the prevention of 
disasters—the disadvantages seem to be overwhelming. It is not clear 
to what extent the payment of ex post relief effectively incentivizes 
the government to take preventive measures.120 Moreover, as 
Professor Depoorter has recently showed, the prospect of having to 
pay ex post relief in the future apparently does not encourage 
politicians to invest in disaster-prevention mechanisms for the simple 
reason that the political benefits of the two are different, which 
results in an oversupply of ex post relief and undersupply of disaster 
preparation measures.121 
However, as we have shown above, notwithstanding the many 
arguments against ex post relief, in practice governments in many 
legal systems cannot resist the temptation to provide generous 
amounts of ad hoc or structural relief after disasters have occurred.122 
As described above, ex post relief may provide large political benefits 
to politicians. Professor Jack Hirschleifer has stated that providing 
compensation after the occurrence of a disaster is so politically 
attractive that the government will invariably find it impossible to 
resist payment,123 and this point has been echoed by others.124 As a 
result, in many countries the compensation for victims of catastrophes 
is a topic of discussion and legal reform.125 One of the issues addressed 
is whether the government can play a role that is less distortive and 
provides better incentives for prevention. 
 
 119.  Epstein, supra note 3, at 297–98. 
 120.  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 208. 
 121.  See Depoorter, supra note 98, at 103–04. 
 122.  See, e.g., Monti & Chiaves, supra note 46, at 169 (“[E]very year the Italian 
Government spends on average 3.5 to 4 billion euros to indemnify damages caused by 
catastrophic events.”). 
 123.  See Hirshleifer, supra note 51, at 146–47 (“In the author’s opinion, in the absence of an 
insurance program, it will be politically impossible for the government not to compensate for 
damage.”). 
 124.  See Peter Siegelman, A New Old Look at Terrorism Insurance: Jack Hirschleifer’s War 
Damage Insurance After 50 Years, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 19, 24 (2002). 
 125.  See, e.g., Véronique Bruggeman et al., The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe 
Risks?, 35 THE GENEVA PAPERS 369, 369–83 (2010); FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 30, at 1–
2. 
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B. Mandatory Comprehensive Insurance: An Attractive Solution 
One possible government intervention to facilitate the provision 
of catastrophe insurance—in particular to stimulate the demand for 
this type of insurance—is to make insurance mandatory. While such 
compulsory insurance does not go totally undisputed (especially in 
cases where it would also force individuals who run no risk at all126 to 
purchase insurance coverage), there seems to be support for such a 
regulatory policy in law-and-economics scholarship.127 
Many scholars—particularly Professor Kunreuther—have argued 
in favor of compulsory first-party (in other words, bought by potential 
victims) insurance for property damage caused by all kinds of natural 
disasters.128 This model, whereby the duty to insure against disasters is 
combined with insurance against a high-probability, low-damage 
event, is also supported by behavioral literature.129 Further, 
compulsory insurance is thought to play an important role in 
improving hazard perception.130 
Professor Kip Viscusi has recently supported the idea of 
mandatory disaster insurance. He defends this approach based on the 
assumption that politicians are unable to deny post-disaster aid.131 
Comprehensive insurance may be an attractive alternative,132 which 
would at least foster self-protection and insurance.133 
However, even if the lack of demand for disaster insurance could 
be solved by mandating the purchase of insurance, problems can also 
 
 126.  For example, an owner of a tenth-floor apartment has hardly any risk of suffering 
flood damage. 
 127.  Mandatory disaster insurance is not the central focus of this paper. For more details, 
see generally Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 6; see also Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 
304. 
 128.  See generally Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, 11 
J.L. & ECON. 133, 142–63 (1968). 
 129.  See id. at 159–60 (discussing how, in this system, the isolated homeowner without 
insurance “would simply be considered a gambler who lost”). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  W. Kip Viscusi, The Hold-Up Problem: Why it is Urgent to Rethink the Economics of 
Disaster Insurance Protection, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A 
DANGEROUS WORLD 142, 142–48 (Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic eds., 2010) (“Saying 
that one will not support assistance after a future hurricane may, of course, be a form of 
hypothetical trash talk. It is a very different matter to actually deny assistance once there are 
identified victims and their stories are featured on the evening news.”). 
 132.  Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and Market 
Behaviour, 1 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 63, 117 (2005). 
 133.  See Viscusi, supra note 131, at 146–48 (offering policies to foster self-protection and 
insurance). 
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arise on the supply side, especially given the “difficult-to-predict” 
nature of catastrophes.134 As pointed out in Part I, the Solvency II 
Directive admittedly mitigates the problem of insolvency of the 
insurer, but a risk remains that there will not be sufficient resources. 
Hence, a question arises: What is the government’s role when the 
amount of damage caused by a disaster is higher than normal 
insurance coverage? As we argued above, any alternative is better 
than providing direct compensation to disaster victims. One 
possibility, discussed in Part II.C, is to have the government act as the 
primary insurer; another, discussed in Part II.D, is to have the 
government serve as a reinsurer of last resort. 
C. Government Acting as the Primary Insurer: The Case of Efficient 
Monopolies 
The increasing dissatisfaction with outright ex post relief 
combined with the feeling that catastrophic losses may be so large 
that traditional insurance markets may not be able to provide full 
coverage has led to the development of new structures. On the one 
hand, insurance markets would be used to the extent possible and, on 
the other hand, the government would intervene to support insurance 
markets when the markets fail.135  
These kinds of structures are increasingly welcomed by law-and-
economics scholars. We will now look at these types of government 
intervention in a more integrative way. First, we will address the role 
of the government as primary insurer. Initially, this approach only 
seems effective in cases where insurance markets would not emerge. 
However, various scholars have stressed that under particular 
circumstances, government monopolies for disaster insurance may in 
fact provide coverage at lower prices than the competitive market. 
1. The Swiss Example 
In Switzerland, home insurance has developed along two lines. In 
nineteen of the twenty-six cantons, insurance is offered by a regional 
monopoly and is compulsory.136 Homeowners are obliged to buy 
 
 134.  For a more detailed analysis of problems on the supply side, see Christian Gollier, 
Some Aspects of Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, in CATASTROPHE RISKS AND 
INSURANCE 13–30 (OECD Publishing 2006); see also FROOT, supra note 7. 
 135.  THE GENEVA ASS’N, RISK & INSURANCE ECONOMICS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011/2012 
49 (2012). 
 136.  Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, The Limits Of Competition: Housing Insurance in 
Switzerland, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1111, 1113–14 (1996). 
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housing insurance against fire and natural disasters.137 However, the 
insurance covers only these two types of damages and does not 
extend to acts of terrorism.138 In the remaining seven cantons, 
insurance is not offered by public monopolies, but by the private 
market.139 This dichotomy allows us to compare two different 
approaches to home insurance within a single country. 
The Swiss example is of course an exception rather than the rule. 
Nevertheless, the general finding is quite striking—namely, in the 
cantons where insurance is offered by state monopolies, the premium 
rates are lower than the rates in cantons with private insurance.140 The 
following diagram compares premium prices of cantonal and private 
insurers between 1984 and 1995 and also provides an overview of the 
different components of the premiums. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Premium Rates Comparison (Fire and natural disasters, 1984-1995)141 
 
This overview shows that, especially with regard to 
administrative costs and commissions, there is a huge discrepancy 
 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See id. (discussing the role compulsory state-supplied insurance plays in housing and 
natural damage insurance markets). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 1114–16. 
 141.  Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Assessing the Efficiency of an 
Insurance Provider—A Measurement Error Approach, 30 GENEVA RISK & INS. REV. 15, 18 
(2005). 
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between the two types of insurers. While the private insurers spend 
thirty-one cents per 1000 square feet of housing stock insured for 
commissions and administrative costs, the cantonal insurers spend 
less than one-fifth of this amount for the same items. This difference 
can be explained by the costs faced by private insurers to manage 
their network of sales agents.142 Since insurance is offered by a 
multitude of insurers, sales agents may have difficulties getting new 
customers. Commissions paid to the sales agents can serve as a 
motivation for these representatives to sell more insurance. These 
commissions for sales representatives of course do not need to be 
paid by state monopolies providing compulsory insurance.143 
Admittedly, a potential downside of the system is that the state 
monopoly has no real incentives to keep costs low. However, as 
shown in the diagram above, insurance is still cheaper in cantons 
where insurance is not offered on the private market. 
Administrative costs alone do not explain the difference in 
premium rates between government-monopoly and private-market 
cantons—as shown in the diagram above, the damage rates also differ 
to a significant extent. Contrary to commentary from the private 
insurance sector, this difference cannot be explained solely by 
exogenous factors. Damage rates may still differ in cantons which are 
sufficiently homogeneous based on geographic proximity and housing 
structure similarity—such as Geneva and Lausanne.144 In this 
example, damage rates in Lausanne are only half as high as in 
Geneva.145 In the latter canton, there is no government supplier, 
whereas in Lausanne insurance is provided by a cantonal monopoly.146 
This difference in damage rates has to be taken together with the 
higher amount spent by the cantonal insurers on prevention. This 
provides for a real-life application of the Coase Theorem147—in the 
cantons where insurance is provided by state monopolies, higher 
amounts are spent on prevention, which is mirrored in lower damage 
rates.148 
 
 142.  See von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 139, at 1116 (discussing the lower administrative 
costs). 
 143.  See id., supra note 139, at 1117. 
 144.  Id. at 1116. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  According to the Coase Theorem, trading in externalities between different bargaining 
parties will, in the absence of transaction costs, lead to an efficient outcome, regardless of the 
initial allocation of property rights. 
 148.  Id. at 1116. 
Faure (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2013  7:51 PM 
Fall 2012] INSURANCE AGAINST CATASTROPHE 215 
Another observation that explains both the incentives for better 
prevention and the advantages of a public monopoly in this sector has 
been brought forward by Professor Winand Emons. Professor Emons 
highlights the importance of certain requirements that must be met in 
order for a house to be insured.149 Compliance with the requirements 
is monitored by insurance companies.150 Because insurance is 
provided by one public monopoly, the result of such testing is rather 
straightforward: either the house passes the test and insurance is 
acquired, or the homeowner must make changes to the house to fulfill 
the required standard.151 In contrast, in the case of multiple insurers, 
the homeowner might be tempted to try to obtain insurance from 
another company instead of trying to bring his house up to the 
required standard set by the first insurer.152 This leads to a decrease in 
prevention costs and eventually to an inefficient market.153 
The Swiss case has been accepted almost unequivocally as an 
example of regional monopolies that operate more efficiently than 
the private sector. The authors have been able to identify only one 
scholar, Professor Bernd Schips, who has brought forward an 
opposing analysis.154 Schips explains that the problem with the 
cantonal monopolies in Switzerland is that political choices do not 
always reflect economic efficiency criteria.155 He is afraid that the 
cantonal monopolies are structured according to criteria that serve 
the political interests of the respective parties and not according to 
efficient objective criteria.156 In his calculation, it is actually the private 
insurers and not the monopolies that offer better prices.157 Rejecting 
Professor Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg’s analysis, Schips concludes 
that the cantonal monopolies are not in an exceptional position and 
cannot be regarded as operating more efficiently than the private 
 
 149.  See Winand Emons, Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies, 49 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 247, 251–55 (2001) (discussing the requirments used to test insurability). 
 150.  Id. at 252. 
 151.  See id. at 253 (analyzing actions a homeowner can take to qualify for insurance 
coverage). 
 152.  See id. at 255–57 (introducing competition into the analysis). 
 153.  Id. at 249–50. 
 154.  Bernd Schips, Ökonomische Argumente für wirksamen Wettbewerb auch im 
Versicherungszweig ‘Gebäudefeuer- und Gebäudeelementarschäden (1995) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with ETH Zuerich). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
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insurers.158 The difference between these analyses, however, can be 
sufficiently explained by the application of different statistical 
methods.159 Given that there is not one paper that supports Schips’ 
analysis, the Swiss example can indeed be accepted as a case of 
efficient monopolies.160 
2. A German Example: The Third Non-Life Insurance Directive 
and its Influence on the Insurance Market in Baden-Württemberg 
That home insurance in the majority of the Swiss cantons is still 
provided by regional monopolies is also due to the fact that 
Switzerland is still not a member of the European Union. The drive 
for liberalization and privatization within the European Union would 
certainly have made it difficult to uphold this system.161 For example, 
in Germany, the introduction of the Third Non-Life Insurance 
Directive162 ended the life of several existing state insurance 
monopolies. The transition to market competition in the home 
insurance sector in Baden-Württemberg nicely illustrates the 
downsides of this shift. Because the demonopolization led to a huge 
increase in premiums, the Baden-Württemberg example fits well into 
the lessons learned from the Swiss case.163 Karl Epple and Reinhard 
Schäfer have also identified similarities between the two cases with 
regard to the calculation of premium rates, and pointed out that the 
state insurer need not pay for advertising and sales representatives.164 
3. Efficient Monopolies - Delineating Key Factors 
Having given two examples in which state monopolies seem to be 
more efficient in the insurance sector than private insurers, this part 
identifies the underlying core variables. The experiences in 
Switzerland and Germany will be used to outline some conditions 
under which government insurance may enhance welfare. 
 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See id. at 31; see also Gebhard Kirchgässner, On the Efficiency of a Public Insurance 
Monopoly: The Case of Housing Insurance in Switzerland, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE 221, 226 (Pio Baake & Rainald Borck, eds., 2007). 
 160.  See Kirchgässner, supra note 159, at 226. 
 161.  Id. at 224. 
 162.  Council Directive 92/49/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 228/1) (EC) (directing EC countries to end 
state non-life insurance policies to provide for a freer market). 
 163.  See Karl Epple & Reinhard Schäfer, The Transition from Monopoly to Competition: 
The Case of Housing Insurance in Baden-Württemberg, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1123, 1129–31 
(1996). 
 164.  See id. at 1129. 
Faure (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2013  7:51 PM 
Fall 2012] INSURANCE AGAINST CATASTROPHE 217 
i. The Compulsory Nature of Insurance Provided by State 
Monopolies—Comprehensive Coverage and Adverse Selection 
As stated above, in the nineteen cantons in Switzerland where 
insurance is provided by regional monopolies, being insured is 
compulsory. Combined with the fact that there will only be one 
insurer from whom the customer can buy insurance, this has two 
major advantages. First, it prevents adverse selection. A major 
challenge faced by insurance companies is to avoid ending up with 
only the bad risks after the good ones leave the pool. Where a state 
monopoly provides compulsory insurance, automatic risk 
diversification takes place.165 This successfully fights the problem of 
adverse selection. In contrast, a regional monopoly offering 
compulsory insurance is better able to offer more comprehensive 
coverage—it can cover risks such as flooding or earthquakes.166 
ii. The Role of Prevention 
The special role that prevention plays under the regime offered 
by the cantonal insurers in Switzerland has already been discussed 
above. Prevention will reduce claims, enabling the insurers to keep 
premiums low.167 It is an absolute prerequisite that the insurer plays 
an active role in preventive measures.168 This is one of the main 
lessons from the Swiss example. By being actively in charge of 
organizing and financing prevention efforts, the cantons have found 
an original solution to the problem of prevention.169 The Swiss model 
seems to work because the cantons are liable for damage payments as 
insurers, and the model provides the cantons with incentives to use 
their public powers to require preventive efforts. Of course, 
preventive efforts are also required from individual insured 
homeowners. Compared to a private market with multiple insurers, 
cantonal monopolies are thereby in a better position to enforce 
preventive efforts.170 
The importance of active involvement is further demonstrated in 
Germany. Despite investing huge amounts in prevention, the 
monopolies never played an active role in preventive measures. Von 
 
 165.  Id. at 1127. 
 166.  See id. at 1125. 
 167.  See von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 139, at 1116. 
 168.  Id. at 1117. 
 169.  THOMAS VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, EFFICIENT MONOPOLIES – THE LIMITS OF 
COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN PROPERTY INSURANCE MARKET 106 (2004). 
 170.  See Emons, supra note 153, at 248–49. 
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Ungern-Sternberg cites this inactivity as one of the reasons that the 
state monopolies in Germany did not survive.171 
iii. Non-Profit Organization 
The form of the institution providing insurance is also relevant 
for a system of efficient state monopolies. Specifically, insurers must 
be non-profit organizations.172 Non-profits are not required to 
generate or distribute revenue. The non-distribution constraint allows 
them to keep sufficient capital reserves while also keeping premium 
rates low. 
iv. Yardstick Competition 
Finally, regional monopolies will only provide insurance 
coverage in an efficient way if competition between different 
monopolies still exists. This sounds contradictory. However, within 
Switzerland there is a form of competition between the different 
cantonal monopolies. This form of yardstick competition should not 
be regarded as competition in stricto sensu but should be understood 
as a means of comparison between the various regional monopolies 
and the services they offer. This has positive effects on innovation and 
efficiency because one regional monopoly can adapt based on the 
decisions of another regional monopoly. Having only one state 
monopoly would destroy this advantage and make the system 
unworkable.173 
D. Government as a Reinsurer of Last Resort 
In this particular case, government intervention is geared 
towards supporting the traditional insurance market, given the 
market’s inability to supply coverage in cases of large-scale disasters. 
It is well-known that disaster insurers fear not only the potential 
magnitude of damage of a given catastrophe, but also the 
unpredictable nature of a catastrophe.174 The basic idea is that, given 
the problems in supplying catastrophe insurance, governments can 
play a positive role by stimulating insurance markets (and thus 
 
 171.  See id. at 248 n.2. 
 172.  See Kirchgaessner, supra note 159, at 236. 
 173.  Id. at 239–40. 
 174.  Kunreuther, supra note 36, at 178–90. 
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applying differentiated premiums) and keeping disaster insurance 
affordable.175  
While there are strong arguments in favor of this type of 
government intervention, the literature on the topic is quite divided. 
Some have qualified these types of interventions as “private- and 
public- insurance responses,”176 others have more generally examined 
“public-private partnerships” consisting of various layers to provide 
comprehensive insurance against natural disasters.177 
1. Drawbacks 
Both in law and economics, there is criticism of the facilitative 
role of the government in stimulating insurance markets.178 Gron and 
Sykes argue that it would be unjust for the government to provide 
(re)insurance at a lower price than the market price.179 This would 
give the wrong signal to the market as far as stimulating insurability is 
concerned. Ad hoc solutions where compensation is provided to 
accident victims on an ex post basis are preferable because market 
participants would not believe that compensation is guaranteed by 
the government. 
Dutch lawyers Ammerlaan and van Boom have been critical of 
the Dutch government’s participation in reinsurance against 
terrorism. They argue that the premium demanded by the 
government is incorrect and that it is not the State’s task to provide 
private insurance.180 Damage caused by terrorism should instead be 
financed through the public purse.181 
It is striking that most of this criticism is not addressed against 
government intervention, but is based on the assumption that the 
government will not charge premiums that properly reflect market 
 
 175.   See generally Howard Kunreuther, Reducing Losses From Catastrophic Risks Through 
Long-Term Insurance And Mitigation, 75 SOC. RES. 95 (2008). 
 176.  See Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 278 (discussing government-provided 
compensation in catastrophes, especially with respect to terrorism risk). 
 177.  See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 72, at 112–13. 
 178.  See Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and Instruments for 
Government Intervention in Natural Disasters, in ON RISK AND DISASTER – LESSONS FROM 
HURRICANE KATRINA 89 (Daniels et al. eds., University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
 179.  See Gron & Sykes, supra note 4, at 458 (questioning the wisdom of U.S. government 
insurance of airlines, noting that the government becomes a problem rather than a solution by 
subsidizing insurance and allowing airlines to externalize their risks). 
 180.  Karin Ammerlaan & Willem van Boom, De Nederlandse Herverzekeringsmaatschappij 
voor Terrorismeschaden en de rol van de overheid bij het vergoeden van terreurschade 
NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 45/46: 2330–39 (2003). 
 181.  Id. 
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prices. It is a criticism shared by Levmore and Logue, who argue that 
the reinsurer of last resort regime only has its desired effect when it 
involves a substantial subsidy.182 They are skeptical of market 
intervention for terrorism insurance, arguing that “the market would 
likely have been able to provide the necessary coverage” even 
without the intervention.183 
2. Advantages 
The arguments in favor of intervention are the mirror image of 
those against: assuming that capacity on the private insurance market 
is severely lacking, insurance coverage for disasters would simply not 
develop without government intervention.184 On the condition that the 
government charges an actuarially fair premium for its intervention, 
government reinsurance is an adequate resolution to the 
uninsurability problem.185 Moreover, this type of government 
intervention has the advantage of avoiding ex post relief sponsored 
through the public purse.  
Where the government acts as reinsurer, those who actually 
cause harm or bear risk can pay the premium, thus facilitating market 
solutions, providing incentives for prevention to potential victims, and 
avoiding the negative redistribution from tax payers to victims.186 
“Thus a State intervention as reinsurer may avoid ‘catastrophic 
responses to catastrophic risks.’”187 This is further supported by the 
fact that the government can diversify the risks over the entire 
population and spread past losses to future generations. This creates a 
form of cross-time diversification, which the private market could not 
achieve.188 Additionally, government participation in insurance 
programs is especially crucial in the context of terrorism, where the 
risk of terrorist attacks is partly under the government’s control and 
 
 182.  Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 304 (arguing that without a meaningful subsidy, 
disaster insurance would still not be “available”). 
 183.  Id. at 311. 
 184.  See Kunreuther, supra note 36, at 180–83; Harrington, supra note 38, at 43–45; 
Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 33, at 167. 
 185.  Faure, supra note 3, at 358. 
 186.  Michael Faure & Klaus Heine, Insurance Against Financial Crises, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
BUS. 117, 129 (2011). 
 187.  Id. (citing  Epstein, supra note 3, at 287); see also Kunreuther, supra note 72, at 113 
(arguing that a government role in supply side assistance may avoid the inefficiencies and 
inequities associated with disaster assistance). 
 188.  See Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Challenges for Terrorism Risk 
Insurance in the United States, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 210 (2004). 
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the government often has more information on ongoing terrorist 
activities.189 
Notwithstanding the objections of some free-market scholars, the 
examples provided in Part I demonstrate the increasing popularity of 
government intervention in providing disaster insurance, either as 
reinsurer or primary insurer. These constructions have the advantage 
of leaving more of a place for market solutions.190 We will take a 
critical look at some of these constructions in Part III. 
III. CONDITIONS FOR A GOVERNMENT ROLE AS (RE)INSURER OF 
CATASTROPHIC RISKS 
The literature arguing in favor and against a government role as 
(re)insurer for catastrophic risks implicitly formulates a variety of 
conditions. In this section, we will examine the particular conditions 
that lead to the most efficient outcomes. 
A. Non-distortive Government Intervention 
Whether or not markets would develop without intervention is, 
of course, hard to judge and is largely an empirical question. For 
example, as far as terrorism is concerned, one can argue that there is 
overwhelming empirical evidence that after 9/11, insurance 
companies began cancelling terrorism coverage.191 However, that does 
not necessarily mean that without government intervention the 
development of a market solution would have been impossible. The 
danger that insurers will overstate the uninsurability argument is 
always present since a partial government takeover of risk may suit 
their interests.192 Accordingly, arguments provided by insurers must 
be viewed with a degree of skepticism. 
 
 189.  See generally Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Insurability of (Mega-) 
Terrorism Risk: Challenges and Perspectives, in 9 TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE IN OECD 
COUNTRIES 107 (OECD Publ’g, 2005) (arguing that the characteristics of terrorism require 
government participation in any terrorism insurance program to be based on public-private 
partnerships). 
 190.  See Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 303. 
 191.  See Robert P. Hartwig, The Impact of the September 11 Attacks on the American 
Insurance Industry, in INSURANCE AND SEPTEMBER 11 ONE YEAR AFTER: IMPACT, LESSONS 
AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES 10, 29 (Patrick M. Liedtke & Christophe Courbage eds., 2002). 
 192.  See Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 298. 
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B. Charging Risk-based Premiums 
Many law-and-economics scholars stress that insurance rates 
should reflect the risk as closely as possible,193 because the premium 
provides a signal to individuals of the risks they actually face. A 
system of risk-based premiums will provide incentives to invest in 
cost-effective loss prevention measures.194  
State-provided insurance should thus charge risk-based 
premiums to reflect the actual risk.195 If the government does not 
receive any premium for providing (re)insurance coverage, 
commercial reinsurers could not compete with the government, and 
the government-provided (re)insurance would amount to a subsidy.196 
In some countries, this could be considered state aid for which 
particular procedures must be followed.197  
C. Stimulating Market Solutions or Providing Efficient Government 
Insurance 
(Re)insurance by the government should be organized in such a 
way that market solutions are still stimulated. If government 
intervention is too “simple,” and imposes artificially low costs, it 
provides no incentives for the market to develop its own solutions. 
However, one should be slightly careful with this recommendation, 
taking into account the Swiss example. As discussed above, disaster 
insurance in the majority of Swiss cantons is offered by regional 
monopolies. This empirical evidence shows that the government 
monopoly may be superior when it is able to provide insurance more 
efficiently than the market due to lower costs of risk differentiation 
(after liberalization). 
 
 193.  See, e.g., WHARTON RISK MGMT. & DECISION PROCESSES CTR., MANAGING LARGE-
SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES: INSURING, MITIGATING AND FINANCING 
RECOVERY FROM NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 363 (Wharton Risk Mgmt. & 
Decision Processes Ctr. ed., 2008). 
 194.  Kunreuther, supra note 72, at 111. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 188, at 204; Levmore & Logue, supra note 
95, at 304. 
 197.  See FAURE & HEINE, supra note 33, at 19 (listing five criteria to determine when a 
national subsidy or regulation qualifies as state aid). 
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D. Leave Freedom with Insurers to Choose State Reinsurance198 
An important aspect of stimulating the market, rather than 
distorting it, is leaving the individual insuree with the freedom to 
decide whether or not to use State (re)insurance. Since the State 
should charge a (re)insurance premium that mimics the market, this 
freedom would allow an insuree to look for cheaper alternatives. 
Requiring individuals to use State-provided (re)insurance could 
endanger competition on the insurance markets. 
E. Temporary Character 
In principle, government intervention should also have a 
temporary character (there should be so-called “sunset provisions”), 
because permanent intervention could have a negative effect on 
competition. This, of course, only holds true if it is assumed that the 
failure of ordinary (re)insurance markets is caused by exceptional 
circumstances (such as the uncertainties that arose after 9/11). 
IV. A TEST 
In Part I, we presented various types of government intervention 
that might stimulate insurability of catastrophic risks. At the end of 
that part, we mentioned our particular interest in models in which the 
government acts as a primary insurer, or as a reinsurer of last resort. 
We will now examine a few arrangements in which the government 
aims to stimulate insurability and apply the conditions discussed in 
Part III for efficient government intervention. We specifically 
examine intervention that solves problems on the supply side of the 
catastrophe insurance market. 
It is not possible within the scope of this paper to critically 
analyze all of the various arrangements that exist in practice, some of 
which we presented in Part I. Accordingly, we have chosen specific 
arrangements that we consider representative of a particular 
compensation model. In Part IV.A, we will describe different kinds of 
government interventions. First, we look at two cases in which the 
government acts as a primary insurer—the California Earthquake 
Authority (CEA) and the Consorcio de Compensacióon de Seguros 
(CCS). Next, we examine a case where the government acts as 
reinsurer of last resort, mostly for natural catastrophes, the French 
Caisse Central de Réassurance (CCR). The role of government as a 
 
 198.  Part III.D borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see BRUGGEMAN, supra 
note 8, at 201. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted. 
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reinsurer of last resort has recently received a lot of attention because 
this model is often followed in the case of terrorism.  
Finally, Part IV.B will then compare the different arrangements 
within the context of the conditions set out in Part III.  
A. Description 
1. Government as Primary Insurer: CEA 
The CEA represents an instance where the government stepped 
into the private insurance market and assumed the risk of a potential 
natural catastrophe. The CEA is a privately funded organization 
managed by the State of California.199 The organization was 
established in September 1996, after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, 
in order to sell residential earthquake insurance policies through 
participating insurance companies and encourage Californians to 
reduce their risk of earthquake losses.200 The CEA currently has a 
claims-paying capacity that exceeds nine billion dollars and writes off 
seventy percent of earthquake premiums.201 The CEA provides for 
deductibles of ten or fifteen percent.202 
The State of California requires insurers doing business in the 
State to offer earthquake coverage in homeowners’ policies, either 
directly or through the CEA.203 The CEA is empowered to set 
premiums and to bear risks, but a so-called “mini-policy” lays down 
which classes of real estate losses are covered.204 In addition, the 
premiums must be set on an actuarial basis.205 In practice, the quoted 
CEA premiums have been tempered so that regional price 
differences are moderated. The CEA may purchase reinsurance, but 
it does not have access to public funds.206 As a result, CEA resources 
are only adequate to compensate an event which is double the size of 
 
 199.  Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., 
http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/index.aspx?id=78&pid=1 (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY: AT-A-
GLANCE (2011), available at http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/UserFiles/File/Release/ 
CEA%20AT%20a%20Glance%20for%202011%20FINAL%20101411-1.pdf. 
 202.  Insurance Policy Information, CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., 
http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/Ceapolicyinformation.aspx?id=2&pid=2 (last visited Dec. 
3, 2012). 
 203.  Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 199. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 74, at 39–41. 
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the Northridge Earthquake.207 Beyond that level, policyholders will 
only receive partial compensation.208 
Participation in the CEA is voluntary—companies may and do 
compete with the CEA, although this competition is mainly limited to 
low-risk locations.209 The CEA charges considerable premiums and 
many homeowners find these too high relative to the coverage 
provided. Consequently, the percentage of Californians with 
earthquake coverage (through the CEA or a private insurer) declined 
from 33% in 1996 to 12% in 2010.210 The CEA has been criticized for 
both its high deductibles and low compensation amounts.211 
2. The Government as Primary Insurer: CCS 
The publicly administered disaster financing program CCS was 
founded in 1954 as a corporation providing insurance against 
“extraordinary risks”—namely natural disasters and risks with “social 
repercussions” such as terrorism and riots.212 It also covers personal 
damage for extraordinary events taking place abroad if the insured 
resides habitually in Spain.213 The Spanish program offers a good 
example of a government collecting a fee or premium in exchange for 
the provision of insurance coverage.  
This extraordinary risk coverage is a “mandatory additional 
coverage added to fire and natural perils, motor and railway vehicles 
and other property damage policies.”214 The extra CCS premium is 
automatically included in the base policy’s premium and varies 
according to the type of policy offered, although it reflects the base 
rate charged on the primary policy.215  
 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Compare CAL. DEP’T OF INS., Earthquake Premium and Policy Count Data Call: 
Summary of 2010 Residential & Commercial Market Totals (CAL. DEP’T OF INS., 2011), with 
CAL. DEP’T OF INS., Summary of 1996: Residential Market Totals (CAL. DEP’T OF INS., 2002), 
available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0200-studies-reports/0300-earthquake-
study/index.cfm. 
 211.  See e.g., Insure your Home Against Natural Disasters, U.S NEWS. (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2012/11/02/how-to-insure-your-home-
against-hurricanes-and-other-natural-disasters. 
 212.  Paul K. Freeman & Kathryn Scott, Comparative Analysis of Large-Scale Catastrophe 
Compensation Schemes, in 8 CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 187, 201 (OECD Publ’g, 
2005). 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
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Prior to 1987, disaster insurance premiums were calculated as a 
percentage of property damage insurance premiums. This meant that 
the premium income was influenced by events unrelated to disaster 
insurance. In 1987, the CCS began setting its own premium, which is 
not risk-related and is equal for the entire country. For example, the 
extra premium for a personal insurance policy amounts to 0.005 per 
mille.216 
“CCS payments are subsidiary to payments made by the private 
insurance industry” and the Consorcio only pays if the risk was not 
covered by private insurance (for example, for the poor who did not  
buy insurance) or if the private insurance company fails to pay due to 
insolvency.217 Typically, domestic insurers in Spain do not cover 
extraordinary risks, but issue policy documentation clearly stating 
that such losses are the responsibility of the Consorcio, to whom 
relevant claims should be addressed.218  
Following Spain’s accession to the European Union in December 
1991, the legal nature of the CCS changed from being a State 
monopoly to a public business institution attached to the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance.219 The CCS now has its own legal capabilities 
with full capacity to act and assets independent from the State.220 In 
addition, given the unique characteristics of the Consorcio, especially 
its high loss potential and very nature as a public entity, it is 
absolutely necessary for the Consorcio to count on an unlimited State 
guarantee. Nevertheless, the organizational structure and financial 
management of its resources has enabled the CCS to meet its claims 
obligations without making use of this guarantee in the more than 
half-century of its existence.221 
Following 9/11 and the March 11 attacks in Madrid, which led to 
a hard cut in cover for non-passenger third-party liability concerning 
the risk of terrorism, the Spanish government asked the Consorcio to 
 
 216.  Riesgos Extraordinarios: El Recargo y su Tarifa, CONSORCIO DE COMPENSACION DE 
SEGUROS, http://www.consorseguros.es/web/guest/ad_re_er (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) 
(discussing additional premiums for personal, property, home, business, car, and infrastructure 
insurance). 
 217.  Freeman & Scott, supra note 229, at 201. 
 218.  Id. (adding that “[d]eductibles for property loss amount to 1% of the insured total and 
a minimum of €150.25”). 
 219.  Ignacio Machetti, The Spanish Experience in the Management of Extraordinary Risks, 
Including Terrorism, in 8 CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 337, 339 (OECD Publ’g, 
2005). 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  See id. at 339–40. 
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cover that risk on behalf of the State.222 The CCS fulfilled this task up 
to October 31, 2002, when coverage became available on the private 
market.223 In addition, the Spanish Association of Insurance 
Undertakings signed an agreement with the CCS under which the 
Consorcio would cover the business interruption risk of companies 
freely joining the agreement as reinsurer.224 This agreement was in 
force until business interruption became integrated in the 
extraordinary risks coverage system.225 
3. The Government as Reinsurer of Last Resort: CCR226 
France has installed a publicly owned reinsurance company, the 
CCR.227 In the French system, reinsurance is not compulsory, and 
insurers are free to contract with other private reinsurance 
companies. However, reinsurance with the state is particularly 
attractive, both because of the relatively low premiums it charges and 
because it can offer unlimited coverage resulting from a State 
guarantee in the event that the CCR exhausts its resources. A CCR 
official noted that insurance companies must transfer half of their 
natural catastrophe risk to the CCR in order to be covered under the 
State guarantee.228 The State thus intervenes as a reinsurer, or, more 
correctly, as a retrocessionaire of the CCR. In exchange for this State 
guarantee, the CCR pays a premium to the State, exactly as it would 
have done if it was protecting itself through an ordinary reinsurer 
(although the latter could not have delivered an unlimited guarantee). 
The reinsurance program is set up to allow insurers to manage 
policyholders’ claims, since they have the best claims-paying 
experience and expertise. Coverage from the CCR takes effect after 
the insured pays a certain deductible.229 
 
 222.  Id. at 340. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Part IV.A.3 borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see BRUGGEMAN, 
supra note 8, at 309–12. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted. 
 227.  Decree No. 82-706 of 10 August 1982 on the Reinsurance Operations for the Natural 
Catastrophe Risks by the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance. Application of Article 4 of the Act 
No. 82-600 of 13 July 1982, JORF 11 August 1982. 
 228.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-199, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: CATASTROPHE RISK 
U.S. AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO INSURE NATURAL CATASTROPHE AND TERRORISM 
RISKS 34 (2005). 
 229.  The CCR’s coverage for natural disasters is unlimited because of the State guarantee. 
The deductible under the CCR reinsurance contract, therefore, represents the maximum 
Faure (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2013  7:51 PM 
228 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 23:185 
Insurance companies that decide to utilize the state reinsurer are 
offered two types of contracts: quota-share contracts and stop-loss 
contracts. With a quota-share contract, the insurer cedes a certain 
proportion of the collected premiums to the reinsurer. In return, the 
reinsurer undertakes the payment of the same proportion of the 
losses. The reinsurer will then truly follow the fortunes of the insurer, 
since the latter has to cede a percentage of each of the policies in its 
portfolio. The risk of adverse selection is hereby avoided. The 
proportional coverage could vary between forty and sixty percent. On 
the other hand, with a stop-loss contract, the reinsurance company 
covers all claims that exceed an agreed upon multiple of annual 
premium income. The insurer will then be protected against the risk 
of multiple claims. In order to prevent insurers from buying their risk-
sharing coverage from private reinsurers and using the CCR only for 
stop-loss cover, the two contracts were tied: stop-loss contracts were 
only offered to those insurance companies who also bought quota-
share contracts from the CCR with a minimum participation of 40 
percent. Jametti and von Ungern-Sternberg conclude that the 
combination of these two types of reinsurance necessarily implies that 
CCR (and ultimately the tax-payer) will bear most of the cost when a 
large-scale disaster occurs.230 
In the first twenty years of its existence, the CCR did not 
accumulate any substantial level of reserves, despite the fact that the 
average claims-to-premium ratio of disaster insurance was only sixty 
percent. Very few changes to the reinsurance scheme were made, 
although the CCR reinsured mainly the bad risks,231 and excessively 
high compensation (twenty-four percent) was paid for (largely 
imaginary) administrative costs.232 In addition, the combined effects of 
changes in the market (mergers, freedom of services within Europe, 
 
amount that an insurer will have to bear in the course of a year, regardless of how many losses 
occur. 
 230.  Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Disaster Insurance or a Disastrous 
Insurance – Natural Disaster Insurance in France 1 (CESifo GmbH, CESifo Working Paper No. 
1303, 2004). 
 231.  See VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, supra note 169, at 86. Von Ungern-Sternberg argues 
that since the insurers have the right, but not an obligation, to reinsure a share of their natural 
disaster risk with the CCR, they have a strong incentive to lobby the government to set high 
premiums for natural disasters. It is then in the insurers’ interest to reinsure only a small part of 
their risks and keep the rest of the premiums for themselves. 
 232.  The effective cost of disaster insurance for the private insurers were, of course, almost 
nil, since disaster insurance was simply added to already existing property insurance contracts. 
In comparison, Spain, which employs an identical system of premium collection, only has a five 
percent commission for administrative costs. 
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among other changes) and the deterioration of the claims figures 
made it increasingly unsuitable for just a single scheme to be offered. 
As a result, from January 1, 1997 onwards, the CCR introduced new 
reinsurance conditions which paid greater attention to the nature of 
each ceding company’s portfolio and enabled insurers to retain a 
larger proportion of the risks.233 Still, in 1999, the CCR was on the 
verge of bankruptcy after it was called upon to make a major 
withdrawal on its reserves. Several major events hit France in 1999—
flooding in the Aude department in the south during November 
(insured losses of € 240 million), flooding following the Winter 
Storms Lothar and Martin (insured losses of € 240 million), and 
damage following a significant hurricane in the French Antilles. At 
the same time, an unexpected peril—soil subsidence—appeared in 
1989, inducing a gradual erosion of the CCR’s reserves over time. The 
State guarantee was consequently called into play. As a result, other 
amendments to the reinsurance scheme needed to be made to better 
adapt to the market situation, such as modifying the underwriting 
conditions, changing the applied deductibles, changing the 
deductibles in case the municipality lacks a PPRN,234 recapitalizing its 
reserves (the government injected three billion French francs, or € 
460 million), and abolishing compensation for administrative costs.235 
Von Ungern-Sternberg, amongst others, has concluded that 
these various amendments to the CCR scheme are the outcomes of 
flaws in the institutional setup.236 On the other hand, Cannarsa and 
others, backed up by the Insurance Journal and A.M. Best, have a 
very positive outlook on the CCR.237 
 
 233.  Caisse Centrale de Réassurance, Les Catastrophes Naturelles en France 20 (2007) 
[hereinafter CCR]. 
 234.  The PPRN is the Plan for the Prevention of Foreseeable Natural Risks (Plan de 
Prévention des Risques Naturels Prévisibles) and is a specific plan that municipalities have to 
draw up concerning the prevention of catastrophic risks. 
 235.  A. Erhard-Cassegrain, et al., Minitére De L’écologie Et Du Développement, 
Évolution du Régime D’ Indemnisation des Catastrophes Naturelles (2004), available at 
http://temis.documentation.equipement.gouv.fr/documents/Temis/0063/Temis-
0063158/18088.pdf; CCR, supra note 233, at 21; Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Catastrophe 
Insurance: Spain vs. France, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/59/33/37781875.pdf (last visited Sep. 10, 2012); Suzanne Vallet, The French Experience 
in the Management and Compensation of Large Scale Disasters, in Catastrophic Risks and 
Insurance 293 (OECD ed., 2006); Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Risk 
Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance—The Case of France, (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1683, 
2006). 
 236.  See VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, supra note 169, at 82–104 (discussing natural disaster 
insurance in France and the problems associated with the system). 
 237.  See Cannarsa et al., supra note 40, at 43. 
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4. The Government as Reinsurer of Last Resort: Terrorism 
i. TRIA 
The American Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) 
establishes a temporary program of shared public and private 
compensation for insured losses resulting from foreign acts of 
terrorism.238 The goal of the program is to “protect consumers by 
addressing market disruptions and ensure the continued widespread 
availability and affordability” of terrorism insurance and to “allow for 
a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume 
pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future 
losses.”239 TRIA essentially creates a federal backstop for terrorism 
insurance by providing financial support for payment of terrorism 
claims in the event of a fairly large terrorism incident. The program is 
similar to reinsurance in that it provides reimbursement to insurers 
after they pay claims to a specified level (the deductible) and in that 
insurers retain a portion of the risk (a co-pay).240 In contrast to 
reinsurance, insurers do not pay a premium to be eligible and the 
government does not establish any reserves. Instead, the costs of the 
TRIA program are borne by the taxpayers with some or all of the 
costs subject to recoupment. In short, TRIA offers an illustration of 
the federal government providing coverage above a baseline risk that 
remains under the coverage of private insurers. The federal 
government temporarily assumes the role of excess liability insurer 
(or as reinsurer of last resort), providing a cap on the losses for which 
the private insurance industry remains responsible in the event of a 
terrorist attack.241 While initially set to last for two years (with the 
expiration date set at December 31, 2005), it has been systematically 
extended ever since.242 
 
 238.  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2002)). The TRIA act does not cover any of the September 11th 
losses. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Thomas Russell & Jeffrey E. Thomas, Government Support for Terrorism Insurance, 
15 CONN. INS. L.J. 183, 186 (2008). 
 241.  Rabin & Bratis, supra note 28, at 325. 
 242.  See, e.g., President Signs TRIA Extension, INSURANCE J. ONLINE (Dec. 27, 2007), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/12/27/85948.htm (discussing 2007 
extension through 2014). 
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All insurers providing commercial243 property or casualty 
insurance are required to participate in TRIA.244 “The insurers must 
make terrorism insurance available to all policyholders,” but are free 
to choose the applicable extra terrorism premium, which should not 
be excessive, inadequate, or discriminatory.245 
“If a certified foreign act of terrorism causes losses in excess of 
[five million dollars], participating insurers must pay a certain amount 
in claims—a deductible—before federal governmental assistance can 
become available.”246  This deductible is now set at twenty percent of 
the insurer’s directly earned premiums during the preceding year.247 
Eighty-five percent of losses above the deductible will be covered by 
the federal government, while the insurance industry contributes 
fifteen percent. There is an annual cap of $100 billion to all aggregate 
insured losses.  
In case the cap would be exceeded, Congress has the authority to 
decide who will pay and in what amounts: the Treasury Secretary 
shall determine the pro rata share of insured losses to be paid by 
each insurer that incurs insured losses under the program . . .  
Insurers that meet the deductible will not be liable for losses in 
excess of this cap.248 
ii. GAREAT249 
French primary insurers that offer fire insurance are required by 
law to provide terrorism coverage as well. In practice, coverage 
against acts of terrorism was generally included in all standard 
 
 243.  TRIA only applies to commercial property and casualty insurance, which is defined to 
specifically include excess insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, and during the first 
three years of the TRIA Program, surety insurance. Workers’ compensation insurance 
mandatorily includes insurance against terrorism, even without TRIA. See HOCKMAN ET AL., 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TERRORISM REINSURANCE POOL FEASBILITY STUDY: SUMMARY 
OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1 (2004) (explaining how workers’ compensation can deal with 
the problem of terrorism losses). TRIA does not apply to personal insurance, such as 
homeowners’, automobile, or life insurance. Moreover, by law, the TRIA program does not 
apply to: federal or private crop insurance; private mortgage insurance, or title insurance; 
financial guaranty insurance offered by a monoline financial guaranty insurance corporation; 
insurance for medical malpractice; health or life insurance, including group life insurance; 
federal flood insurance; and reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance. 
 244.  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 442. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. at 443. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  The GAREAT section borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see 
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 309–12. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted. 
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insurance policies, meaning that all private and commercial 
properties were generally covered against terrorism events. However, 
after the September 11th attacks, reinsurers cancelled their terrorism 
coverage and many primary insurers that could not obtain 
reinsurance chose to stop offering (especially commercial) property 
insurance to avoid the mandatory terrorism coverage. According to 
French insurance industry officials,250 the French government 
responded to this situation by first temporarily requiring the 
extension of all contracts, and then beginning negotiations with the 
insurance industry to develop a more permanent solution. As a result, 
the GAREAT (Gestion de l’Assurance et de la Réassurance des 
Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme) reinsurance pool was 
created jointly by insurers, reinsurers, and the CCR on January 1, 
2002. The idea of GAREAT is based on the existing administrative 
structures of the insurance associations and the natural catastrophe 
program already in place in France. The goal of GAREAT is to cover 
acts of terrorism (including those involving the use of nuclear 
weapons) that cause damages on French territory and assimilated 
territories. 
Though GAREAT membership is not mandatory for insurance 
companies operating in France, insurers affiliated with the national 
association of insurance companies (Fédération Francaise des 
Sociétés d’Assurances) and the main trade body for mutuals 
(Groupements des Entreprises Mutuelles d’Assurance) automatically 
qualify as members of the pool. Upon subscription to GAREAT, 
each member is liable in proportion to the amount of the premiums 
ceded to the pool with respect to the subscription year. 
The GAREAT program is divided into two sections: “Large 
Risks” and “Small and Medium-Sized Risks.” The Large Risks 
section entails all contracts which fall within the scope of application 
of the GAREAT pool and whose insured sums are in excess of € 20 
million. The Small and Medium-Sized Risks section includes 
contracts less than € 20 million. This section will not be discussed 
further, since properties less than € 20 million may be ceded to the 
pool on a voluntary basis. 
Both sections are the subject of specific provisions and each 
section is divided into layers. The first layer of the program consists of 
co-reinsurance between the members of the pool. The losses to this 
layer are split between the members proportionally to their respective 
 
 250.  See U.S. GAO, supra note 228, at 39–40. 
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shares. The next layers consist of reinsurance by professional 
reinsurers, who provide capacity in the form of Annual Aggregate 
XOL treaties. These layers are the subject of reinsurance treaties. 
The top layer consists of unlimited reinsurance granted by the CCR 
with a guarantee from the French state. This layer is the subject of a 
reinsurance treaty with the CCR. For this purpose, the CCR receives 
a premium from GAREAT. 
In 2012, the co-reinsurance layer had a limit of € 400 million for 
the entirety of the losses. The second, third, fourth, and fifth layers 
constitute the Annual Aggregate Excess of Loss reinsurance program 
taken out by GAREAT on the international reinsurance market. The 
second to fifth layers are each limited to € 400 million. The sixth layer 
constitutes the top layer where the CCR provides coverage (with an 
unlimited guarantee from the French State), with an XOL threshold 
of € 2 billion. 
The figure below illustates the reinsurance scheme: 251  
 
Fig. 2. GAREAT layer system. 
 
 
 
 
 251.  Christine de Bondy, Secretary-General of GAREAT, Terrorism Schemes in the 
World: France: GAREAT, Questions and Issues before 6th Meeting of the World Forum of 
Catastrophe Programmes 18 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ccrif.org/partnerships/WFCP/ 
Sessions/Day2/France_GAREAT_WFCP_Meeting_Oct_2011.pdf. 
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The GAREAT premium rates are fixed by reference to the 
amount of the sums insured: 
 
Amount of total sums insured GAREAT premium rate 
Sum insured < € 6 mio (facultative session) 3 %
€ 6 mio < sum insured < € 20 mio 6 %
€ 20 mio < sum insured < € 50 mio 12 %
€ 50 mio < sum insured 18 %
sum insured > € 750 mio quoted individually 
nuclear risks 24 %
exceptional risks (e.g. captives) special rating
Table 1. GAREAT premium layers. 
 
Consequently, in 2007 GAREAT earned € 252 million in 
premiums on 105,000 policies. 
iii. NHT252 
The Dutch government and the Dutch Association of Insurers 
agreed to set up a dedicated reinsurance company, called the Dutch 
Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company (NHT), to cover insurance 
against terrorist acts in all classes of business. This step represented 
an intervention measure to address a market failure to supply 
terrorism risk coverage. 
Since July 1, 2003,253 more than 250 insurance companies (ninety-
three percent of all active Dutch insurers), the government, and some 
reinsurance companies participate in the NHT. The participating 
insurance companies cede all their terrorism exposure to the NHT 
pool, which acts as a reinsurance company. The overall capacity of is 
limited to € 1 billion per calendar year. It was foreseen that this 
threshold of € 1 billion would be gathered in three layers: the first € 
400 million will be reinsured by the participating primary insurers, 
while losses in excess of € 400 million in the annual aggregate will be 
protected under a reinsurance market XOL program valued at € 300 
million, with any shortfall taken up by the Dutch government, acting 
as a reinsurer of last resort, up to another € 300 million. The first layer 
applies a so-called threshold deductible, meaning that insurers bear 
the risk to € 7,5 million.  
 
 252.  The NHT section borrows from a book written by one of the authors, see 
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 8, at 377–79. To ease readability, quotation marks have been omitted. 
 253.  The NHT became operational on July 1, 2003. It has been periodically extended for 
additional periods, and is expected to be further extended as long as market conditions require. 
Faure (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2013  7:51 PM 
Fall 2012] INSURANCE AGAINST CATASTROPHE 235 
The Dutch government charges a premium at a level intended to 
price itself out of the market when terrorism risk insurability is 
restored. From the period of July 1, 2003 until December 31, 2003, the 
government charged a premium of € 10 million (€ 20 million on a 
yearly basis).254 A system of descending premiums is used for 
increasing coverage. For example, the first part of coverage is 
relatively expensive—coverage of € 100 million demands the same 
premium as the next increment of € 200 million. Thus, an incentive is 
incorporated into the system in order to stimulate the recovery of 
commercial insurance: if individual reinsurers are capable of covering 
the risk, expectations are that they would offer coverage for a lower 
premium. This point of departure seemed to pay off, since a 
commercial reinsurer declared itself willing to cover the first € 100 
million of governmental coverage (namely between € 700 and 800 
million), delaying governmental intervention until the € 200 million 
threshold.255  
B. Analysis 
The focus of this part is to compare the different arrangements 
that have been described in the previous paragraphs. The criteria 
established in Part III will serve as the framework for this comparison 
in order to evaluate which economic criteria have been fulfilled by 
the different kinds of government interventions. 
1. Non-distortive Government Intervention 
In the case of the CEA, it is doubtful whether there really was an 
absence of a market solution after the Northridge Earthquake, since 
other insurers provided coverage for earthquakes. Rather, it is an 
example where the government steps in as primary insurer and thus 
competes with other insurers. Whether the CCS had to be established 
in 1954 due to the absence of market solutions is not entirely clear. It 
is possible that a similar mechanism could have been provided by the 
market. This is similar to the case of the CCR. It is not so clear that 
without the CCR insurance of natural disasters would have been 
impossible. It is clear, though, that an unlimited guarantee (which is 
provided by France to the CCR) would never be provided by an 
ordinary reinsurer. Concerning the terrorism cases, it is clear that, 
 
 254. Parliamentary Proceedings of the Second Chamber of Representatives 2002–2003, 28 
668, No. 2, 23 June 2003. 
 255.  Parliamentary Proceedings of the Second Chamber of Representatives 2002–2003, 28 
915, No. 5, 12 August 2003, p. 3. 
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indeed, no market solution would have been possible. TRIA, for 
example, was clearly created because, after 9/11, insurance companies 
worldwide had withdrawn from covering terrorism risk, creating a 
market vacuum. 
2. Charging Risk-based Premiums 
The criteria for setting CEA premiums indicate that premium 
prices reflect risk. Indeed, the California Insurance Code states that 
“[r]ates established by the authority shall be actuarially sound so as to 
not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”256 From this, 
one can conclude that premiums should in theory always reflect risk. 
However, this is not the case for the CCS. Since 1987, the CCS has set 
premiums that are unrelated to risk and equal for the entire country. 
The CCR’s criteria for its premium prices are not entirely clear. It has 
to pay a premium for the provided State guarantee—which should, in 
principle, be market-based. 
The terrorism cases are not identical. It is clear that the 
reinsurance provided by TRIA is an outright subsidy since insurers do 
not even pay a premium. The NHT, on the other hand, does charge 
risk-based premiums. 
3. Stimulate Market Solutions 
It is unclear how the CEA stimulates a market solution since the 
government competes with commercial insurers. Given that the CCS 
sets its own premiums that are unrelated to risk, the CCS does not 
really stimulate market solutions either. Recalling that the CCR 
benefits from an unlimited guarantee provided by the French 
government, which would never be provided by an ordinary 
reinsurer, it is also unclear how the CCR stimulates a market 
solution. In fact, the CCR is clearly not market competitive because 
its premiums are inherently more attractive due to their State 
guarantee. In that sense, the CCR is more of a market disruption than 
a solution. 
An important feature of TRIA is that the State does not 
completely take over the risk since insurers must still pay a modest 
deductible. Nevertheless, one could argue that this still stimulates a 
market solution. Similarly, GAREAT could be regarded as a market 
stimulator to a certain extent, especially with regard to its first and 
second layers. However, GAREAT’s reliance on state-guaranteed, 
 
 256.  CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.40 (2010). 
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unlimited reinsurance granted by the CCR reduces the extent to 
which GAREAT indeed stimulates market solutions. The NHT, on 
the other hand, stimulates market solutions because it seems to set 
premiums in such a way that it also becomes attractive for private 
(re)insurers to develop their own insurance products. 
4. Leaving Freedom for Insurers to Choose State Reinsurance 
The freedom to join the CEA is relative since insurers are 
required to offer earthquake coverage. The CCS, on the other hand, 
establishes an arrangement in which insurers have the freedom to 
choose. In the case of the CCR, it is not particularly clear. Insurers 
have freedom to contract with private reinsurance companies, but 
some sources argue that insurance companies would have to transfer 
at least half of their natural disaster risk to the CCR. The three 
terrorism cases provide a clear example of schemes in which the 
government leaves the freedom with the insurers to participate or 
not. 
5. Temporary Character 
The CEA, CCS, and CCR do not seem to have a temporary 
character. 
TRIA was initially established as a temporary program, but has 
since been continually extended. GAREAT was never established as 
a temporary program. The projected duration of the NHT is unclear, 
but it may be temporary given its premium structure and the strong 
incentives it sets to create market solutions. 
C. Summary 
We have presented various examples where the government 
provides some kind of intervention, usually to supplement insurance 
coverage in the compensation of disasters. These examples and the 
subsequent analyses could easily be extended to other cases as well.257 
All we wish to show with these examples is that, in fact, no matter 
what type of structure is followed, there are some striking similarities 
and differences. It is remarkable that a premium is not always 
charged for government intervention (as in TRIA) and that in cases 
 
 257.  For further examples of how to improve the management and insurability of large-
scale disasters, see Alberto Monti, Public-Private Initiatives to Cover Extreme Events, 5 THE 
GENEVA REPORTS: RISK AND INSURANCE RESEARCH 27 (2011); Alberto Monti, Climate 
Change and Weather-Related Disasters: What Role for Insurance, Reinsurance, and Financial 
Sectors?, 15 HASTINGS W.NW. J. ENVT’L POL’Y 151 (2009). 
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where this premium is charged, it is doubtful that the premium 
actually reflects risk. Moreover, in some cases, the government in fact 
competes with the market (CEA) and in other cases merely provides 
a government guarantee because otherwise an insurance cartel could 
simply refuse to provide coverage altogether.258 In those cases, 
government intervention is problematic in the sense that one can 
wonder to what extent it actually stimulates a market solution. 
Moreover, in practice, none of the solutions presented has a 
temporary character. 
If one would compare the performance of government acting as 
primary insurer (for example, the CEA and CCS), our examples seem 
to be doing relatively poorly since they do not have a temporary 
character and do not stimulate market solutions. However, on the 
basis of these results, one should be careful in concluding that this 
type of government intervention is therefore necessarily inferior to 
the role of government acting as reinsurer of last resort. After all, 
there are other cases where government monopolies have done very 
well in avoiding the charity hazard and in stimulating prevention.259 It 
is also striking that in the three cases we discussed concerning 
governments reinsuring the terrorism risk, there are some similarities 
and differences. In all three cases there was a clear absence of a 
market solution since the traditional insurers refused to cover 
terrorism risk after 9/11. Also, in all three schemes the government 
leaves the freedom to join with the insurers. However, only the Dutch 
scheme (NHT) seems to set premiums in such a way that it becomes 
attractive for commercial (re)insurers to develop their own insurance 
products. This is, as we just mentioned, obviously not the case in the 
United States, where TRIA basically provides gratis reinsurance. 
Each of the examples provided shows that it is difficult to 
structure government intervention in a way that corresponds 
completely with economic principles. To some extent this is not 
surprising since the intervention of government in stimulating 
insurance markets may always have the character of a subsidy. These 
 
 258.  This is, for example, the case in the Netherlands where crop insurance is covered 
through Agriver with a government guarantee. See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure & 
Karine Fiore, The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?, 35 THE GENEVA PAPERS 
369, 383–84 (2010) (explaining that crop insurance is covered through Agriver with 
governmental guarantee in the Netherlands). 
 259. See, e.g., Emons, supra note 153, at 249–50; see also generally Raschky, supra note 108 
(comparison of risk transfer systems indicate that government intervention may not exacerbate 
the charity hazard). 
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(preliminary) results do give some support to those who were critical 
of government intervention in the first place.260 
The results from this modest comparison of the cases discussed in 
this part can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Non-
distortive 
government 
intervention? 
Premium 
Reflect 
Risk? 
Stimulate 
Market 
Solution? 
Temporary 
Character? 
Freedom 
for 
Insurer? 
CEA - + - - +/- 
CCS +/- - - - + 
CCR +/- +/- - - +/- 
TRIA + - +/- +/- + 
GAREAT + +/- +/- - + 
NHT + + + +/- + 
Table 2. Comparison of the Six Cases 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Compensation for victims of catastrophes is a hot topic in many 
countries. This is due both to the damage in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
the increasing number of natural disasters that have affected the 
United States, Asia, and Europe. Accordingly, there has been an 
increasing amount of legislative intervention to stimulate insurance 
markets in public-private partnerships. The reactions in the literature 
to these types of constructions vary: some economic literature relying 
largely on market solutions is quite critical of this intervention, 
whereas other, more insurance-related literature argues that these 
types of government intervention should be welcomed since they 
increase the insurability of risks that would otherwise be uninsurable. 
The aim of our paper was to add to that debate by looking at specific 
cases where the government acts either as a primary insurer or as a 
reinsurer of last resort. Indeed, to some extent the arguments in favor 
of or against government acting as a (re)insurer of catastrophe risks 
play at a high level of abstraction.  
Of course, we have merely discussed a few of the possible forms 
of government intervention, most of them focusing on the supply side. 
Other literature discusses many additional alternatives, some of 
which focus on the demand side. Some examples include tax 
reductions for victims of catastrophes and outright subsidies to 
 
 260.  See Role for Government, supra note 4, at 44–51; see also Levmore & Logue, supra 
note 95, at 308–09. 
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charitable organizations.261 If compensation of victims is the main 
goal, other structural arrangements are also possible, such as in the 
sphere of social security.262 Discussing all of these alternatives was 
outside the scope of our Article. 
 On the basis of theoretical law-and-economics literature, we 
posited a few conditions for efficient (or at least minimally disruptive) 
government supplementation of disaster insurance markets. For 
example, one important question is whether the government 
intervention is absolutely necessary—in other words, would a similar 
market solution have emerged without the intervention? Insurers 
may argue that they consider a risk uninsurable and thus call on 
government relief, but this does not necessarily mean the risk was 
actually uninsurable. Also, effective intervention means that a 
government asks for a premium price that mimics the market price. 
However, that supposes that one can actually know the price of an 
actuarially fair premium, which may be difficult in some cases. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by many of the examples we discussed, 
sometimes the government simply does not want to ask for an 
actuarially fair premium, since doing so may jeopardize the 
affordability of the scheme (premiums may become prohibitively 
high). If that is the case, one could question whether the government 
should intervene by providing gratis reinsurance or whether specific 
differentiated subsidies should be provided to individuals to allow 
them to purchase differentiated insurance contracts.263 The examples 
in this paper show that it is difficult in practice to structure 
government intervention in a way that corresponds with principles of 
economic efficiency. To some extent, this may not be surprising; some 
types of government intervention aim not only at efficiency, but also 
at redistribution. However, the question again arises whether acting 
as reinsurer of last resort is the most effective way of redistributing 
money to victims of catastrophes. We have argued that this 
intervention may be less distortive than ex post relief. By stimulating 
or backing up insurance markets, at least some differentiation of risks 
is possible—which is usually totally absent in the case of ex post relief. 
Regardless, many of the examples we discussed indicate that 
intervention as reinsurer of last resort often amounts to a state 
subsidy.  
 
 261.  Levmore & Logue, supra note 95, at 308–09. 
 262.  See Langendonck, supra note 21, at 187–97 (discussing funding options at the 
international level). 
 263.  As recently suggested by Kunreuther. 
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Based on analysis of specific cases where the government acts as 
(re)insurer of catastrophic risks, we argue that there may be fewer 
reasons for economists’ traditional objections against government 
intervention. The Switzerland example clearly shows that it may be 
possible to have an efficient public insurance monopoly that prevents 
catastrophic risks and the charity hazard more effectively than 
commercial insurance markets. Moreover, reality shows that 
politicians will always find it hard to resist ex post relief despite the 
objections of economists. Even though government acting as 
(re)insurer of catastrophic risk may not always completely comply 
with economic principles, it is at least far superior to the Santa Claus 
model of ex post relief. In the future, given the expectation that many 
countries may be confronted with huge amounts of catastrophe-
related damage, government-supported insurance mechanisms 
certainly deserve more attention. 
 
